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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, the production – marketing decisions in a duopolistic market are 
studied. The defined problem consists of two competitor firms and is based on their 
pricing, advertising and production decisions. Objectives of both firms are assumed to 
be profit maximization.  
 
The proposed solution procedure is based on a cyclic solution in which one of the 
firms solves its own problem at each step of the cycle. It is assumed that firms forecast 
their competitor’s pricing and advertising decisions and use these data as an input for 
their own model. The termination condition of the cycle is defined as the equilibrium, 
where none of the firms changes its pricing and advertising policy significantly as a 
response to its competitor’s decisions.  
 
The problem is formulated as a non-linear mixed integer programming (NLMIP) 
model and two solution methods are employed. First, a commercial package to solve 
NLMIP problems (GAMS ®) is used. Second, a genetic algorithm (GA) developed to 
solve the problem is employed. Both of these methods are employed at each step of the 
solution cycle.  
 
The problem is solved for different parametric conditions using both solution 
methods. Sixteen initial forecasts, combinations of low and high averages and standard 
deviations of pricing and advertising forecasts of the competitor, are analyzed. Under 
each of these forecast cases, 5 parameters, price elasticity, cross-price elasticity, 
advertising lagged effect weights, ratio coefficient for competitor’s advertising effect, 
and cross-moving demand are analyzed. The impacts of these parameters on the pricing, 
advertising, and production decisions of the firms under the sixteen initial forecasts 
produce similar results. In addition, the demand volumes and the profit values are 
investigated for these parameters. Price elasticity is observed as the parameter having 
the greatest impact on decisions, followed by cross-moving demand, advertising lagged 
effect weights, cross-price elasticity, and ratio coefficient for competitor advertising 
effect, respectively.  
 
Keeping the firm’s cost structure constant, competitor’s cost structure is changed 
so as to increase its production cost considerably compared to the previous experiments. 
Through a set of experiments, the impact of the change in the cost structure on the 
pricing, advertising and production decisions is investigated. A sensitivity analysis is 
applied to the logit demand function parameters over a wide range and the results are 
reported.
ÖZET 
 
 Bu tezde, duopolistik pazarda üretim – pazarlama kararları incelenmiştir. 
Problem, iki firmadan oluşmaktadır ve firmaların fiyat, reklam ve üretim kararlarına 
dayanmaktadır. Her iki firmanın amacı kâr maksimizasyonu olarak varsayılmıştır. 
 
 Önerilen çözüm prosedürü her bir adımında firmaların kendi modellerini 
çözdükleri döngüsel bir çözüme dayanmaktadır. Firmaların rakiplerinin fiyat ve reklam 
kararlarını tahmin ettikleri ve bu tahminleri kendi modellerine girdi olarak kullandıkları 
varsayılmıştır. Döngünün sona erme noktası; firmaların kararlarında, rakiplerinin 
kararlarına karşılık önemli bir değişiklik yapmadıkları durum olan denge noktası olarak 
tanımlanmıştır. 
 
 Problem, doğrusal olmayan tam sayılı programlama şeklinde formüle edilmiş; iki 
çözüm metodu uygulanmıştır. İlk olarak, ticari bir paket olan GAMS kullanılmıştır. 
Ardından, Genetik Algoritma ile çözüm metodu geliştirilmiştir. Her iki metot da, 
döngünün her adımında uygulanmıştır. 
 
 Problem, farklı parametrik koşullar için her iki metotla da çözülmüştür. Rakip 
firmanın fiyat ve reklam kararları tahminlerinde alçak ve yüksek ortalama ve standart 
sapmaları içeren on altı farklı başlangıç tahmini incelenmiştir. Bu tahminlerin her biri 
için beş parametre, fiyat esnekliği, çapraz fiyat esnekliği, reklam geçmiş dönem etkisi 
ağırlıkları, rakibin reklam etkisi için oran katsayısı ve çapraz hareketli talep, analiz 
edilmiştir. Bu analizlerin, on altı başlangıç tahmini için benzer sonuçlar verdiği 
görülmüştür. Ek olarak, talep ve kâr değerleri incelenmiştir. Fiyat esnekliğinin, kararlar 
üzerinde en etkili parametre olduğu, bunu sırasıyla çapraz hareketli talebin, reklam 
geçmiş dönem etkisi ağırlıklarının, çapraz fiyat esnekliğinin ve rakibin reklam etkisi 
için oran katsayısının izlediği görülmüştür. 
 
 Firmanın maliyet yapısı sabit tutularak, rakibin maliyet yapısı dana önceki 
analizlere oranla yüksek maliyet oluşturacak şekilde değiştirilmiştir. Bir dizi analizle, 
bu değişimin fiyat, reklam ve üretim kararı üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. Ayrıca, 
logit talep fonksiyonu parametreleri de geniş bir aralıkta değiştirilerek hassasiyet analizi 
yapılmış, sonuçlar raporlanmıştır.   
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1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM DEFINITION 
In today’s competitive world, firms need to make their decisions involving more 
complex marketing and production issues. As the new technologies and new business 
types are developed, firms always have to keep up with these changes. These 
improvements and innovations in working methods enforce decision makers to take 
many issues into consideration. In decision-making, importance of coordination of 
various departmental actions is increasing with these changes in business methods. For 
instance, a manufacturing firm has to consider its marketing and production decisions 
by paying attention on the effects of each decision on the others.  
 
Marketing and production actions have conflicting objectives in general. 
Marketing is interested in attracting customer’s attention and mainly aims to increase 
total sales. On the other hand, production is mainly concerned with reducing production 
and inventory costs. The integration of these departmental actions in a cooperative 
manner has gained importance in last decades.  
 
Each department in a company has different objectives that are specific to its 
work area. The objectives of marketing are to increase sales or market share, to satisfy 
customers, and to create loyal customers as a result of customer satisfaction in general. 
Improvements in marketing aimed to find new methods to reach to customers, to 
persuade customers to select firm’s products / services, to identify and satisfy customer 
needs etc. However, production’s objective is totally different, which is providing 
simplified production processes and making production easy to manage. New 
production methods and technologies are being developed continuously to make 
manufacturing systems easier to control and to work with less failure. These differences 
in objectives of various departments lead to a non-cooperative working environment 
and cause sub-optimization of firm’s profits. In most manufacturing firms, marketing 
and production are organizationally separate. Marketing department sets prices, decides 
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advertising activities and other marketing mix variables. Marketing department aims to 
reach highest demand, highest market share, more profitable customers and similar 
goals for the firm while making these decisions. The market, by regarding these 
decisions, creates the demand. After the demand is generated, production department 
starts with production planning and then manufactures goods. In this case, production 
department aims to minimize its costs in given conditions. As seen from this procedure, 
departments usually act separately and try to achieve their individual goals. However, in 
such a case the most probable result is a sub-optimal firm profit. Conflicts between 
various departments are widely studied in the literature (see e.g., Kotler (1971), Shapiro 
(1977)) 
 
Shapiro (1977) lists eight general areas where potential conflicts are possible. He 
defines these areas as “necessary cooperation but potential conflict” and identifies them 
between marketing and production. He lists these eight areas as:  (i) capacity planning 
and long-range sales forecasting; (ii) production scheduling and short-range sales 
forecasting; (iii) delivery and physical distribution; (iv) quality assurance; (v) breadth of 
product line; (vi) cost control; (vii) new product introduction; and (viii) adjunct services 
such as spare parts inventory support, installation, and repair. In the first two of these 
conflicting areas, he addresses problems in capacity planning, production scheduling, 
and sales forecasting. All of these areas are highly related with demand generation. 
These problems are faced frequently when marketing and production decisions are 
taken separately. If each department forecasts its demand according to its own decision 
variables, the possibility of inconsistency increases easily. In his third area, Shapiro 
points out the different requirements of departments in distribution and location areas. 
While marketing is interested in customer needs, production department is concerned 
with its raw material supply and distribution needs as well. In this case, distribution 
strategy and facility location problems arise. In fourth problem area, customer needs 
and quality assurance is stated. In today’s world, customer’s desires are to be satisfied 
with customized products. Marketing aims to supply such products to customers in 
order to satisfy their needs. On the other hand, this kind of production needs higher 
flexibility in manufacturing and leads to increasing quality problems because of 
“employee unfamiliarity and system errors”. For example, Swamidass (1987) points out 
the importance of including manufacturing managers in decision making procedure. He 
states that the role of manufacturing managers in strategic decision making affects 
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positively the strategic results in environmental uncertainty, because the manufacturing 
managers are nearer to the production and more able to consider the abilities of their 
firms. Since the manufacturing managers can evaluate flexibility better, they should be 
involved in the strategic decision making in any case. Product variety is another 
problem area, since marketing department prefers to supply differentiated products to 
customers. However, a wide product line creates problems for production in raw 
material inventory planning, production setups etc. Order processing and transportation 
costs are also increasing with higher product variety. Cost control is the sixth problem 
area in Shapiro’s list since marketing department’s needs, such as rapid delivery, high 
quality, and wider product line; bring cost increases in production. New product 
introduction is one of key advantages for marketing department. However, production 
department faces many problems while introducing new products such as requirements 
of new equipments, new production processes, employee training etc. Some minor 
changes for marketing may cause major change in needs of manufacturing, and some 
objective conflicts arise in such cases. Eighth problem area is stated as adjunct services. 
Shapiro gives example of product installation and says that “factory people tend to view 
final installation as the final manufacturing operation while marketers view it as a 
customer service function”. He states that these conflicting problems can be solved 
when both departments are convinced that they serve a higher objective. They have to 
understand that they “need for a balanced situation but still strongly represent their own 
interests”.   
 
Hausmann et al. (2002) discuss the importance of marketing and production to 
work together. They argue that both departments have to be involved in the strategic 
decision making process. They propose a research model which takes the relative 
importance of marketing and manufacturing within the business unit as inputs. They 
propose four possible outcomes of the model, namely marketing morale, manufacturing 
morale, competitive position, and profits. They conduct a survey and conclude that “a 
successful business strategy implementation will increasingly depend on the marketing / 
manufacturing ability to work together harmoniously”. They also note as a result of 
empirical study that the business performance is increased when these departments 
work together for a common goal.  
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Decision making procedure of marketing and production has to be continued in 
coordination in order to overcome these conflict areas. Joint decision making is an 
important opportunity in this case.  
 
Competition is another important point in today’s business environment. As 
reaching and analyzing information becomes easier, the competition between 
companies increases. This situation makes harder to attract customers since it becomes 
easier for customers to compare many choices before giving decisions. Increasing 
competition enforces firms to pay more attention to their decisions and decision making 
strategies. Inconsistencies between departmental actions affect companies more in a 
competitive environment than it does in a monopoly or non-competitive market. 
External factors, such as competitor’s decisions, also have to be considered in strategic 
decision making procedure.  
 
Interest in competition is increasing in literature while the market conditions 
become more complex over time. Both marketing and production models representing 
competitive actions are studied. Competitive actions in marketing decisions are related 
with demand generation and can be evaluated by sales or revenue values. Furthermore, 
in production side of a company, competition is an important topic as it is in marketing 
side. Companies consider their production capabilities and cost in order to support their 
marketing department in competence. Stalk (1992) defines four basic principles of 
capabilities-based competition:  
 
i) The building blocks of corporate strategy are not products and markets 
but business processes. 
ii) Competitive success depends on transforming a company’s key 
processes into strategic capabilities that consistently provide superior 
value to the customer. 
iii) Companies create these capabilities by making strategic investments in a 
support infrastructure that links together and transcends traditional 
Strategic Business Units and functions. 
iv) Because capabilities necessarily cut across functions, the champion of a 
capabilities-based strategy is the CEO.  
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As he points out, strategic actions are more important in a competitive business 
environment. He pays attention to business processes rather than products and markets. 
For various departments of a company, working in cooperation is very important to 
transform key processes into strategic capabilities. He also notes that strategic 
investments to install a supporting infrastructure linking strategic business units have to 
be done to be able to compete on capabilities. He states that “capabilities-based 
competitors identify their key business processes, manage them centrally, and invest in 
them heavily, looking for a long-term payback”. 
1.1. Problem Definition 
Objectives of this study are to propose a model for firms competing in a 
duopolistic market and to investigate how this model gives results in different market 
conditions. Within the firms, the marketing and production decisions are considered 
simultaneously, based on a joint decision making model. Marketing decisions are 
represented in the model as pricing and advertising decisions that affect demand 
generation. On the other hand, production decisions are considered as production 
scheduling, inventory and backlog decisions. Since marketing actions are creating 
demand, these decisions are related with revenue generation. Production decisions are 
mainly related to cost reductions. However, since all decisions are taken simultaneously 
in the model, both departments have a common objective, which is profit maximization. 
In this setting, it is investigated how departments make their decisions jointly.  
1.2. Solution Strategy 
Since the market structure is assumed to be duopolistic, the solution methodology 
aims to reach solutions for both of the firms. The solution strategy presented here is 
based on a cyclic solution method rather than a simultaneous solution procedure. Each 
firm is assumed to use its competitor’s decisions as input for its own problem and then 
takes decisions in order to reach its own goal. Here, each firm uses its competitor’s 
pricing and advertising expense decisions as inputs for its own model. Both of the firms 
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are assumed to have same objective, which is maximizing their own profits. Since each 
firm aims to maximize its profits, it interacts with its competitor in demand generation. 
Production decisions of the competitor do not have any impact on the other firm’s 
objective, so only price and advertising expense information of the other firm are used 
as inputs. Cycling procedure is followed until both firms do not make any changes in 
their policies as a response to the other firm’s actions. The proposed general solution 
procedure aims to show whether both of the firm’s decisions reach equilibrium in terms 
of price, advertising expenses and production. This cycle is generated until both of the 
firm’s decisions reach equilibrium. Of course, this cycle is interrupted even if no 
equilibrium occurs after a certain number of steps. 
 
The model is solved by two different solution methods, and the results are 
compared. First, a non-linear mixed integer programming (NLMIP) model is 
formulated. The package program GAMS® is used to solve the NLMIP model and will 
be referred to from here on as a standard solution tool for solving the NLMIP model as 
a mathematical programming model. Each output of a solution (in terms of price and 
advertising expenses) is included as an input for the other firm’s problem. Demand 
function and objective function constitute the non-linear part of the problem. The 
constraints which are included to deal with the piecewise linear nature of the production 
cost curve involve binary variables. At each step of the cycle, NLMIP model is solved 
and results are included into the other firm’s model. An initial feasible solution for 
NLMIP is given at the first step of the cycle. Although inputs of the model about 
competitor’s decisions change, this point is used without any modification at each step 
in order to provide a consistent solution procedure. Since the model is non-linear, the 
initial solution affects the results. Thus, the initial solution to be employed is decided 
upon after a certain number of trail solutions consisting of the first few steps of the 
cycle.  
 
Second, a solution methodology based on genetic algorithm (GA) is employed. 
Since solution space of the problem is large and includes local optima, GA is used in 
addition to GAMS®. Search methodology of GA is defined for the problem, and a 
cycling solution methodology is applied using GA. This approach is designed to reach 
optimal or near-optimal solutions of the problem within the general cyclic solution 
methodology proposed.  
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GA is used to solve the model of the firms at each step of the cycle. Here, price 
and advertising expense decisions of a firm’s competitor are used as an input for the 
firm’s model as it is used in the solution methodology using GAMS®. In the general 
procedure, outputs of this solution (price and advertising expense decisions) are 
included into the competitor firm’s model in addition to its own parameters and the 
model thus obtained is again solved using GA. In conclusion, GA is used to solve 
individual models of each firm, so it is executed at each step of the cycle. The roles of 
GAMS® and GA in the general solution procedure are represented in Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 The design of the general solution procedure 
End 
No 
Determine the parameter 
values & variable limits 
Generate competitor’s 
advertising & price values 
Solve the firm’s model 
(GAMS / GA) 
Incorporate the 
competitor’s decisions 
into firm’s model 
Equilibrium? 
Equilibrium? 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Step# >Limit 
Step# >Limit 
Incorporate the firm’s 
decisions into 
competitor’s model 
Solve the competitor’s 
model (GAMS / GA) 
 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
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Chapter 2 includes a comprehensive literature review on the marketing – 
production models. In this chapter, major studies on marketing and production are 
explained as well as joint decision making studies. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the modeling environment, which defines the market 
structure, the pricing, the advertising, and the structure of firms. The proposed demand 
function and the mathematical model for the problem are reported in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 explains the solution procedure and describes the basic theory and 
concepts of GA. In addition, it includes the design of experiments. 
 
Chapter 5 reports the results of experiments and includes conclusions based on 
these results. 
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2. MARKETING – PRODUCTION MODELS 
Modeling the marketing – production decisions has been studied for a long time 
both in marketing and production literatures. Since these two different operations have a 
strong relationship, models combining both have received increasing attention. 
However, models representing each of them separately are developed before joint 
models.  
 
During development of marketing models, the main aim was to analyse the 
market, sales and revenue. Market share can also be seen as an issue in these models 
(see e.g., Karnani (1985), Monahan (1987)). Several decision variables are considered 
in marketing models, e.g. price, promotion, distribution, quality and so on. Profit or 
revenue maximization are usually considered as model objectives.   
 
Game theoretic model of Nash states basic concepts for these models. There are 
three widely used models of duopoly:  
 
1. Cournot (based on symmetric quantity competition),  
2. Bertrand (based on symmetric price competition), and  
3. Stackelberg (based on asymmetric quantity competition with a first and a 
second mover). 
 
In the Cournot model (some times called Cournot / Nash duopoly), two firms 
produce identical goods and make their output decisions independently. Each takes the 
other's output, and selects its own best output with given the downward sloping market 
demand curve for the product in question. Total output and market price are represented 
as equilibria to the "non-cooperative" production game between the two firms. 
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The Bertrand model assumes that each firm competes on price. In effect, each 
firm bids for the business of consumers in a market with homogeneous products. In the 
Stackelburg model, the first mover (leader) tries to take account of the likely output 
decision of the other firm (the second mover or follower) when making its output 
decision. In effect, it chooses its profit maximizing output given the "reaction function" 
of its competitor. 
 
More complicated models of marketing are developed after these basic models. 
Models defining sales as market share are named as market share attraction models. 
Kotler (1965) defines a market share attraction model for a duopolistic market. He takes 
price, advertising expenses and distribution expenses as decision variables of each firm, 
and makes a simulation study. He also considers growth, seasonality, merchandising 
and competitive characteristics of the market. He classifies marketing strategy in nine 
classes as: (i) non-adaptive strategy in that firm saves marketing mix levels through the 
product life cycle; (ii) time dependent strategy in which marketing mix decisions are 
functions of time; (iii) competitively adaptive strategy which follows the changes in the 
marketing mix of competitor and adapts it into firm’s decisions; (iv) sales-responsive 
strategy that leads firm to adjust its marketing mix decisions according to past sales; (v) 
profit-responsive strategy where the firm changes its marketing mix decisions “in 
response to inter-period changes in profits”; (vi) completely adaptive strategy in which 
firm takes changes in its own and its competitor’s sales and profits, in time passage, and 
in its competitor’s marketing mix into consideration; (vii) diagnostic strategy in which 
firm first distinguishes possible reasons of changes and then acts; (viii) adaptive profit-
maximizing strategy where firm uses (or if not actually available predicts) its 
competitor’s marketing mix decisions to take its own decisions aiming profit 
maximization; and (ix) joint profit-maximizing strategy in which the firm convinces its 
competitor to maximize sum of their profits.  
 
Krishnan and Gupta (1967) study a mathematical model for a duopolistic market 
with two control variables, price and promotional effort. In their model, each firm 
knows the other firm’s manufacturing costs and the total market size is constant for a 
given period. Each firm’s market share depends on its relative effective promotional 
effort and the difference between its own and its competitor’s price. They also add 
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different effectiveness of promotional effort for each firm. According to these 
assumptions, they suggested the following model: 
                               1 2
1 1 2 2
( 2 )
( )
i i
i i
sf k p p p
s s
α
α α
= + + −
+
   for i=1, 2;                          (2.1) 
where, si is the expenditure on promotional effort of firm i and αi is the coefficient of 
effectiveness for firm i. In this model, pi is the price of ith firm, where k is a positive 
constant and fi is the market share for firm i. They consider a constant unit cost and 
formulate the revenue function as: 
                                1 2
1 1 2 2
( 2 ) ( )
( )
i i
i i i i i
sR A k p p p p c s
s s
α
α α
 
= + + − − − + 
                  (2.2) 
where Ri is revenue for firm i, A is the total constant market in units of product and ci is 
constant unit production cost. 
 
Karnani (1985) aims to deduce the practical implications of market share 
attraction models. He presents a game theoretic analysis of market share attraction 
models using the solution concept of Nash equilibrium. In an oligopolistic market, he 
defines market share in his model as: 
                                               1
1 1
( )
( )
k
k
m
i i ik
k
i mn
j j jk
j k
a p e
s
a p e
α
α
∈−
=
∈−
= =
=
∏
∑ ∏
                                                   (2.3) 
where,  
eik : expenditure on marketing activity k by firm i, 
pi : product price for firm i, 
ai : a measure of consumer preference for firm i, 
si : market share in terms of revenue for firm i, 
n : number of firms in the market, 
R : total market size in terms of revenue, and 
α, θ, ∈1, …, ∈m : industry specific parameters.  
 
Unlike Karnani (1985), Monahan (1987) assumes a duopolistic market rather than 
an oligopolistic one and he also excludes effect of price on market share. In addition, he 
assumes a fixed market potential. His study derives equilibrium allocations and 
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establishes their dependence on factors such as gross profit margins, attraction 
elasticity, resource budgets, and relative effectiveness effort. He uses 
                                                ( , )
i
i i
i i i
i i i
i i i i
V a xS x y
a x b y
β
β β= +
                                              (2.4) 
and 
                                                   ( )
i
i
i i i
i
i i i
d a x x
dx a x
β
ββ =                                                   (2.5) 
where Si(xi,yi) is market share of firm X in the ith market when Vi is total market 
potential and xi and yi are marketing efforts for firms X and Y, respectively. ai and bi are 
parameters. βi is attraction elasticity of effort and it is assumed to be equal for both of 
the firms. Then, he studies optimal resource allocations of firms in different markets 
maximizing their profits given limited budget constraint. 
 
Nakanishi and Cooper (1974) suggest a theory for parameter estimations for such 
big problems.  
 
Vidale and Wolfe (1957) study sales response to advertising and base their study 
on an empirical study. They suggest three parameters describing the interaction of sales 
and advertising: 
 
a)  Sales Decay Constant: Sales of a product, S(t), decreases in a constant rate, if 
it is not promoted. They represent this situation by  
      ( ) (0) tS t S e λ−=       (2.6) 
b)  Saturation Level: This constant, M, is described as practical limit of sales that 
can be generated. It depends not only on the product being promoted but also 
on the advertising medium used. 
c)  Response Constant: They define a response constant, r, as the sales generated 
per advertising dollar, when S = 0. In general, it is defined as r(M-S) / M when 
sales are at level S.  
 
By using these parameters, the model they developed is as follows: 
             ( )( )S rA t M S
t M S
δ
δ λ
−
=
−
      (2.7) 
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where A(t) is the rate of advertising expenditure. They study the sales response to 
advertising efforts, the impact of advertising pulse, and the total advertising budget 
allocation.  
 
Deal (1979) extends Vidale and Wolfe (1957)’s monopolistic model by using the 
following duopolistic model:  
    1 1 1 1 1 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )] /
( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )] /
x t a x t b u t M x t x t M
x t a x t b u t M x t x t M
= − + − −
= − + − −
!
!
    (2.8) 
where, xi(t) is sales for brand i at time t, ( )ix t!  is the first derivative of sales with respect 
to time for brand i at time t, ui(t) is the advertising expenditure for brand i at time t, ai is 
the sales decay parameter, bi is the sales response parameter and M is the total market 
potential size.  
 
He lets firms to be able to set different objectives and suggest the following 
model: 
     
0
2max ( ) /[ ( ) ( )] { ( ) ( )}
f
i
t
u i i i f i f j f i i i
t
J w x t x t x t c x t u t dt= + + −∫     (2.9) 
where i and j are the firms, ci is the net revenue coefficient, wi is the weighting factor for 
the performance index, to and tf are initial and termination times of the planning horizon, 
respectively. Deal uses the same model for both firms while allowing them to give 
different importance to the market share and profit maximization.  
 
Lilien and Rangaswamy (1998) state benefits of using decision models as: i) 
improve consistency of decisions, ii) explore more decision points, iii) assess the 
relative impact of variables, iv) facilitate group decision making, and v) update 
subjective mental models.  
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Figure 2.1. Benefits of using decision models 
 
Before they define types of market response models, they address Saunders’ 
(1987) eight phenomena to show the abilities of models. These phenomena are: 
P1) Output is zero when input is zero. 
P2) The relationship between input and output is linear. 
P3) Returns decrease as the scale of input increases (every additional unit of input 
gives less output than the previous one gave). 
P4) Output cannot exceed some level (saturation).  
P5) Returns increase as scale of input increases (every additional unit of input 
gives more output than the previous one gave).  
P6) Returns first increase then decrease as input increases (S-shaped return). 
P7) Input must exceed some level before it produces any output (threshold). 
P8) Beyond some level of input, output declines (supersaturation point). 
 
The following are basic response models and their abilities in handling these 
phenomena.  
i) The linear model: With its form of  
        Y a bX= +      (2.10) 
this model can handle P1, P2, and also P4 and P7 if it is constrained to lie 
in a range. It does not accommodate P3, P5, and P6. 
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ii) The power series model: If parameters are selected appropriately, this 
model can handle P1, P2, P3, P5, P6, and P8 with its form of 
                                     2 3 ...Y a bX cX dX= + + + +    (2.11) 
iii) The fractional root model: It is defined as  
       CY a bX= +      (2.12) 
It can handle P1, P2, P3, P4, and P5, depending on the parameters. If 
c=1/2, it is called the square root model. It is called the reciprocal model 
when c = 1. If a = 0, then c also means the elasticity of where it is called 
the reciprocal model when c = 1. If a = 0, then c also means the elasticity 
of X on Y.  
iv) The semilog model: In the  
    ln( )Y a b X= +               (2.13) 
form, this model handles P3 and P7 and can represent advertising activities 
showing decreasing returns when increasing efforts.  
v) The exponential model: It has a form of  
        bXY ae= ,     (2.14) 
where X > 0. It handles P5 and, if b is negative, P4. It is widely used in 
price response functions. 
vi) The modified exponential model: It is formulated as  
    (1 )bXY a e c−= − + .    (2.15) 
It has a saturation level of a+c and lower bound of c, and it can handle P3 
and P4.  
vii) The logistic model: With its form of 
    
(1 )b cX
aY d
e− +
= +
+
,    (2.16) 
it reaches a+d as saturation level and has a S-shape first with increasing 
and then decreasing returns.  
viii) The Gompertz model: This is less widely used S-shaped function as 
    cXY ab d= + ,     (2.17) 
where a > 0, 1 > b > 0, and c < 1. This model handles P1, P4, and P6.  
ix) The ADVBUDG model: this model is suggested by Little (1970) as 
           ( )
c
c
XY b b a
d X
= + −
+
.    (2.18) 
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It is S-shaped for c > 1 and concave for 0 < c < 1. Its lower bound is b 
where upper bound is a. This model handles P1, P3, P4, and P6 and it is 
widely used in modeling response to advertising and selling effort.  
 
Lilien and Rangaswamy (1998) refer also to Saunders (1987) when describing 
three kinds of interactions between marketing mix elements: i) No interaction exists, ii) 
they are multiplicative, or iii) they are both multiplicative and additive. With separate 
response functions f(X1) and g(X2) for two different marketing mix elements, X1 and X2, 
these can be represented as:  
    1 2( ) ( )Y af X bg X= + ,    (2.19) 
      1 2( ) ( )Y af X g X= ,    (2.20) 
            1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y af X bg X cf X g X= + + ,   (2.21) 
respectively. a,  b, and c are parameters in these equations. 
 
Of many issues in marketing decision models, competition plays one of the most 
important roles. Reaction matrices are used as a modeling approach to competition. In 
case of duopoly and competence on price and advertising, these matrices are described 
by Lilien and Rangaswamy (1998). The following is an example, where η’s are constant 
elasticities  and a multiplicative function is employed to represent the interaction.  
 
Figure 2.2. Reaction matrix: two firms; two marketing variables 
 
Elasticities can be estimated with the equations, 
1 1 1 2 2 2log ( ) log ( ) log ( )P t a b P t b A t= + +    (2.22) 
1 2 3 2 4 2log ( ) log ( ) log ( )A t a b P t b A t= + +    (2.23) 
ηP1P2   ηP1A2 
ηA1P2*  ηA1A2 
Firm 2 
Firm 1 
P1 
A1 
P2 A2 
*ηA1P2 = percentage change in A1 with a 1% change in P2. 
 17 
where b1 is estimation of ηP1P2, b2 is an estimate of ηP1A2. Lambin, Naert, and Bultez 
(1975) make an application for this matrix and show that firm 2 significantly reacts to 
the actions of firm 1. They also show that indirect responses based on price-advertising 
relations are important, and that reaction behaviour is complex.  
 
Lilien and Rangaswamy (1998) describe four different advertising budget 
decision methods on which Patti and Blasko (1981) and Blasko and Patti (1984) worked 
and reported statistics.  
 
a)  Affordable method: This method represents the idea of a firm should spend 
whatever funds it has available for advertising. It leads to fluctuating 
advertising budget and this makes harder to make long-run plans.  
b)  Percentage of sales method: This method is based on setting the following 
term’s advertising budget as a percentage of sales (either current or 
anticipated). It provides an affordable budget and encourages the managers to 
think relationships between advertising cost, selling price, and profit per unit. 
However, there is logical basis on determining the percentage. What is 
generally applied when setting percentage is to consider past applications, 
competitor’s applications and costs.  
c)  Competitive parity method: In this method, firms set their advertising budgets 
to match competitor’s outlays. This may prevent advertising wars but it is 
illogical when considering advertising reputations, resources, and objectives.  
d)  Objective and task method: The budget is developed by i) defining 
advertising objectives as specifically as possible; ii) determining the tasks 
needed to achieve these objectives, and iii) estimating the costs of these tasks 
in this method. Its major limitation is that it does not indicate how to choose 
the objectives and how to evaluate them and to decide whether they are worth 
the cost of attaining them.  
 
Rao and Miller (1975) define a model for sales response to advertising expenses. 
They assumed that advertising has an immediate effect and a lagged effect. The lagged 
effect decays exponentially. Their model is, 
    20 1 1 1 1 2 ...t t t t tS c c A c A c Aλ λ η− −= + + + + +    (2.24) 
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where St is market share at time t, At is advertising spending at time t, c0, c1, λ are 
constants (0 < λ < 1), and ηt is random disturbance. With this model, the short run effect 
of advertising is  
      1t
t
dS c
dA
= .     (2.25) 
The long run effect is  
     2 11 1 1 ... 1
cc c cλ λ
λ+ + + = −
.    (2.26) 
Little (1970) introduces a model, ADBUDG, for advertising effects. His 
assumptions are the following: 
i) If advertising expenses are zero, sales will decrease to a minimum level. 
ii) Independently from how much spent on advertising, the sales are limited 
by a maximum level, called as saturation point.  
iii) There is some advertising rate that will maintain current sales. 
iv) An estimate can be made on data analysis or managerial judgment of the 
effect on share by the end of one period of a 50% increase in advertising 
over the maintenance level. 
Figure 2.3 represents the assumptions stated above. 
Figure 2.3. Little’s assumptions for advertising 
 
End Share with +50% Advertising 
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Share 
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Max. Share at End 
Initial Share 
Min. Share at End 
Saturation 
Advertising 
+50% Advertising 
Maintenance  
Advertising 
Zero 
Advertising 
One Period 
Time 
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He sets  
     ( )
c
c
advSales b a b
d adv
= + −
+
    (2.27) 
where a, b, c, and d are constants. The curve will be S-shaped if c > 1 as shown in 
Figure 2.4, and concave when 0 < c < 1. 
Figure 2.4. Advertising vs. sales graph for Little’s model (ADBUDG)  
 
Batra et al. (1996) point out that logit or logistic regression models are widely 
used by direct marketers. They state that direct marketers estimate their logit models on 
previous campaigns to forecast responds to upcoming marketing action.  
 
Lilien and Little (1976) and Lilien (1979) investigate the factors which condition 
the marketing of industrial products, in the ADVISOR project. The model defines 
marketing or advertising spending and based on last year’s sales and number of 
customers the marketing program must reach. The proposed model is, 
    1 20 1 var
i
t t i
i
marketing sales usersβ β ββ
−
= ∏    (2.28) 
where marketing is spending on marketing in dollars, sales is sales in dollars (lagged 
one year), users is number of individuals the marketing program must reach, β0, …, βI 
are regression coefficients, and vari represents other variables (stage in life cycle, 
product plans, etc.).  
Maintenance +50% Advertising 
Min 
Initial 
+50%
Advertising
Max 
Share 
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Gatignon (1993) states the traditional response function generally as  
     1( , ; , , )y f X Z β γ ε=      (2.29)
where  
y = a measure of market performance such as product sales, 
X = a set of marketing variables (possibly with lagged effects) hypothesized to influence 
y, 
Z = a set of environmental variables (which could contain the marketing activities of 
competitors) hypothesized to influence y, 
β = the response parameters of the marketing variables, 
γ = the response parameters of the environmental variables, 
ε = disturbance term (possibly with a specific covariance structure due to time dynamics 
or due to competitive model specification). 
 
He also defines a function, the process function, which explains the parameter 
vector β of response function as the following. 
         2 ( , ; , , )f X Zβ α δ ν=     (2.30) 
This equation is developed by three main considerations: i) marketing variables, 
ii) environmental conditions, and iii) stochastic element. Marketing variables generally 
affect each other positively. Chances in environmental conditions also affect the 
response equation, such as changes in effectiveness of marketing variables. The 
introduction of stochastic component represents the unexpected portion of the market-
response parameter.  
 
He defines advertising effect with its both direct and indirect effects on response 
function. He assumes that advertising affects response indirectly over distribution while 
also affecting directly. So the distribution and response functions are formulated as the 
following. 
0 1 1 2t t t tD D Aα α α ε−= + + +     (2.31) 
0 1 2t t t tS D Aβ β β ν= + + +     (2.32) 
and when they are combined, 
    0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1t t t t t tS D A Aβ β α β α β α β β ε ν−= + + + + + +   (2.33) 
where Dt is distribution at time t.   
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Rao (1993) lays out a framework for reviewing carious pricing models. He 
analyses static and dynamic models for single products. In dynamic models, he focuses 
on pricing of product over a time path under different market conditions. He concludes 
that a skimming policy is optimal when customers expect decreases in price in the 
future, costs are declining by the time, the word-of-mouth effects are weak; and market 
is becoming saturated.  He also works on multiple-product pricing models and points 
out the opportunities that bundling creates. 
 
Batra, et al. (1996) point out the long-run impact of advertising activities as 
follows: 
   “If we believe that advertising generates a substantial lagged effect on 
sales, then the impact of advertising campaign may not be known for 
certain until an unacceptable length of time has passed. For example, an 
important contribution of a six-month campaign might be its impact twelve 
months hence. Research has estimated that, at least for frequently 
purchased nondurable goods, the effect of an advertising exposure can take 
up to nine months to get dissipated.” 
 
As they define, the lagged effect of advertising on sales is crucial. However, they 
also point out that it is very hard to evaluate this lagged effect, since there may be two 
problems. First, there might be changes in other factors affecting demand in this lagged 
effect period and it might be hard to isolate sales change affected by advertising 
activities.  Second, for more timely and accurate information, variables that respond 
more quickly to advertising input must be sought. The long-run impact of advertising is 
shown in Figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.5 Long-run impact of advertising 
 
Eliashberg and Steinberg (1993) work on joint decision making models for 
marketing-production with convex and concave cost functions. They analyze 
decentralized versus coordinated decision making. They show that in decentralized case 
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firms lead to sub-optimal profits. They also notice that prices are higher and lot size is 
smaller in coordinated case than they are in decentralized case. After studying various 
possible formulations of decentralized versus joint decision making problems, they 
reach the conclusion that coordinated system performs better.  
 
Ulusoy and Yazgac (1995) develop a marketing-production joint decision making 
model; dealing with pricing, advertising and production decision over a time period for 
a multi-product supplying company. They include advertising lagged effects into 
demand generation function and employ a piece-wise linear cost curve. Golden section 
search and linear mixed integer programming is used to solve the problem. In 
advertising budget allocation, dynamic programming is used and results for both 
fluctuating and smooth demand cases are reported.  
 
 Most of the studies about marketing and production decisions are interested in 
models that are considering only a firm’s problems. Competition effects and market 
conditions about environmental effects are mostly discarded in these studies. On the 
other hand, when the competition is included into the models, the models are based on 
marketing decisions. In brief, they do not discuss marketing – production joint decision 
making within a firm in a competitive market and the models represent marketing 
decisions’ effects on the demand generation. These models exclude the production 
decisions of a firm. 
 
 The absence of models discussing marketing – production joint decision making 
in a competitive fashion is the main motivation point of this study. The objective is to 
formulate a model and a solution procedure for this problem.  
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3. A MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR THE PROBLEM 
In this study, a mathematical model representing both marketing and 
manufacturing decisions is developed aiming to maximize the firm’s profits while its 
competitor operates under the same objective. These firms compete in a single market, 
and some assumptions constituting the marketing and production environment are 
described in the following sections.  
3.1. Modeling Environment 
3.1.1. Market Structure 
Market structure is the description of the buyers and sellers in the market. There 
are two extreme points of the market structure: 
 
i) Monopoly, 
ii) Perfect competition. 
 
In a monopolistic market, the firm sets the price levels. It can also decide in 
advertising and other marketing mix variables. Here, the firm only considers customers’ 
willingness to pay the determined price under effects of other marketing mix variables’ 
levels. Thus, basically it can be said that in monopoly, the firm takes customers’ 
responses into account while determining the marketing mix decisions.  
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On the other hand, in a perfect competitive market, no players’ actions affect the 
price level. The demand curve (price vs. quantity) is horizontal in a perfect competition. 
Here, market conditions are determined by participation of all players’ decisions.  
 
In this model, a duopolistic market is considered. Duopoly is a kind of market 
structure, where both customers’ decisions and competition take place.  
 
The market in which the firm serves is assumed to have the following properties: 
a) There are two firms in the market, so the market is duopolistic. During the 
planning horizon no other competitors are allowed to join the market.  
b) Potential market size (maximum demand) is constant and static during the 
planning horizon. Firms can reach this total demand value for the lowest price 
– maximum advertising case.  
c) Production (or sales) capacities of firms are assumed to be equal to potential 
market in their maxima. This assumption allows increases or decreases in total 
actual sales in different periods, but increases are limited by a potential market 
volume. Total demand in a period can be altered by different marketing 
decisions. 
d) Firms compete in the market with a single product. 
e) All potential customers have to select the product of one of the firms or none. 
This means total actual market size (active demand) in a period can decrease 
compared to the previous period, since customers may not be willing to buy 
from any of the firms. This situation depends on the pricing and advertising 
policies of the firms in the period. 
f) The product is assumed to be a fast moving consumer good (FMCG). It is 
assumed that customers may purchase a particular product repeatedly in many 
consecutive periods, so the market potential may not reach a saturation point 
during the planning horizon, with the demand becoming zero,.  
g) It is assumed that seasonality does not exist in the market for the types of 
products considered. 
h) The products of both firms are exact substitutes. There are no differences 
between products in terms of quality, usefulness, attractiveness, etc.  However, 
reverse cross-price elasticity affects the willingness of the customers to shift 
between firms concerning price. 
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i) Periods are defined as quarters. Total planning horizon is assumed to consist 
of 12 periods, i.e. 3 years. 
3.1.2. Pricing 
Pricing decisions are one of more critical decisions in the marketing, since it is 
very effective on demand. In most cases, an increase in price leads to lower demands. 
As an example to exceptions, luxury items can be mentioned. However, since FMCG 
products are under consideration, it is expected that demand decrease whin prices 
increase and vice versa. In marketing literature, elasticities related with price and 
demand are defined. In this study, price elasticity and cross-price (as price difference) 
elasticity are used.  
 
Price elasticity is defined as the change in demand due to a change in price.  
Mathematical representation of price elasticity is given as, 
1 *
S P
P S
α
∆
=
∆
       (3.1) 
where P is price, S is sales (demand), and α1 is the price elasticity. 
 
Cross-price elasticity is described as the change in demand of a product due to a 
change in price of another product. The relative positions of the products in the market 
determine cross-price elasticity. Under the assumption of negative price elasticities for 
both of the products, if products are substitutes, then an increase in the price of one of 
the products would result in decreased demand of the product and in increased demand 
of the substitutive product, while other marketing conditions are static. However, if 
products were complementary, then an increase in the price of one of the products 
would generate lower demand for both of the products. Hence, if products are 
substitutes, then cross-product elasticity is expected to be positive. If products were 
complementary, then negative cross-product elasticity would be representative. 
Mathematical representation of price difference elasticity is given as,  
* yxc
y x
PS
P S
α
∆
=
∆
       (3.2) 
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where Py is price of product y, Sx is sales (demand) of product x, and αc is cross-product 
elasticity.  
 
In this thesis, pricing decisions are allowed under some assumptions. Price levels 
are allowed to be in a given interval in the model, where defined elasticities (price and 
price difference elasticities) affect both firms’ decisions.  
 
a) Price elasticity may change at different levels of price since the product may 
be purchased by different segments of the market. However, it is assumed that 
there is no segmentation in the market in terms of revenue or other 
demographic properties and price elasticity does not change over periods, 
since the total planning horizon is assumed to be sufficiently short.   
b) Cross-price elasticity (price difference elasticity) of demand between firms 
does not change over periods, since the total planning horizon is assumed to 
be sufficiently short.  
c) Customers base their purchasing decision on prices and advertising activities 
of both of the firms as well as the price difference between the firms. It is 
assumed that there are two types of customers in the market:  
i) Customers deciding by considering consistently only one of the firms.  
ii) Customers deciding according to the price difference between the 
prices of the products of the two firms. 
It is assumed that while the price difference decreases (in absolute terms) 
between products, number of customers considering price difference also 
decreases. These people decide on one of the firms and are affected only by 
this firm’s price and advertising activities. However, when the price difference 
increases, more people focus on this difference and decide accordingly. On the 
other hand, when the prices are equal, then the customer segment (ii) becomes 
part of the customer segment i.  
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3.1.3. Advertising 
Under these market structure conditions, firms decide on their individual pricing, 
advertising and production decisions. Advertising is one of the more important 
components of marketing mix variables as a result of its effect on demand. Advertising 
is a wide research topic in the marketing literature on its own. Advertising is used for 
many objectives in marketing, such as introducing a product or a service, creating and 
maintaining brand image, informing potential customers about other marketing 
conditions etc. In this study, advertising decisions are given under the following 
assumptions: 
 
a) Advertising activities provide a certain increase (in absolute value) in demand. 
The interaction between a firm’s advertising and pricing decisions as well as 
its competitor’s decisions are reflected into the demand function in an additive 
fashion as described by Saunders (1987).  
b) Advertising has a lagged effect on sales. Advertising spending in a period also 
affects the sales of consecutive n periods but its effect decays over the periods. 
The model of Rao and Miller (1975) concerning lagged effect of advertising is 
employed hereafter replacing exponential decay by linear decay. Since the 
product is assumed to be a FMCG, the lagged effect period is taken to be 3 
consecutive periods as stated by Batra et al. (1996). 
c) The competitor firm’s advertising activities also affect the number of 
customers deciding based on the price difference. It is assumed that this 
advertising also creates product awareness in addition to brand awareness. So, 
when a firm’s price is lower than its competitor’s price, the competitor’s 
advertising activities generate more demand for the firm, since this advertising 
creates product awareness. When the firm’s price is higher than its 
competitor's price, the competitor’s advertising affects negatively the firm’s 
demand.  
d) Advertising effectiveness is assumed to be increasing up to a certain level of 
spending and decaying when more advertising expenses are incurred after that 
level. This is defined as S-shaped curve of advertising spending versus sales. 
A model representing this situation is suggested by Little’s (1970) ADBUDG 
model. This is defined with an S-shaped advertising expense vs. advertising 
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affected sales curve and a bell-shaped advertising expense vs. marginal 
advertising affected sales curve. Graphical representation of S-shaped 
advertising expense vs. advertising affected sales curve is given in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 Advertising affected sales vs. advertising expenses 
 
Figure 3.2 represents the bell-shaped advertising expense vs. marginal 
advertising affected sales curve. 
The marginal increase in sales versus advertising expenses has also a maximum, 
which depends on price. While the price increases, the maximum marginal 
increase in sales versus advertising decreases. The level of advertising expenses 
needed to reach this maximum also increases when the price increases.  
Figure 3.2 Advertising expenses vs. marginal advertising affected sales 
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 The logistic model of the  
     ( )1 b cX
aY d
e− +
= +
+
      (3.3) 
is used to represent S-shaped advertising expense vs. advertising affected sales 
curve. Here, Y represents the advertising affected sales while X represents 
advertising expense. The parameter a stands for the saturation level, b for the 
location parameter, and c for the advertising impact factor, where d is a 
correction parameter. The saturation level, a, defines the maximum additional 
demand created by advertising activities when the maximum advertising 
expense is spent. The location parameter, b, shifts the advertising expense vs. 
marginal advertising affected sales curve. Thus, while b increases, the required 
advertising expense to reach the maximum advertising affected sales decreases 
and vice versa. Here, c, the advertising impact factor, affects both the maximum 
marginal increase of sales versus advertising expenses and the required 
advertising expenses to reach this maximum level. Therefore, parameter c is 
used to define the linkage between price and marginal increase of sales versus 
advertising. The formula  
    21 2( * )c Pγ γ= +       (3.4) 
is used to represent this interaction, where P is the price and γ1 and γ2 are 
parameters. The advertising impact factor vs. price graph is given in Figure 3.3.  
Figure 3.3 Advertising impact factor versus price curve 
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While c increases, the maximum marginal increase of sales increases and 
required advertising expense to reach this top level decreases. The correction 
parameter, d, allows setting the desired level of advertising affected sales by 
advertising expenses. For instance, d can be used to set the level of advertising 
affected sales to zero, when no advertising activity is done. With interaction of 
these parameters, the advertising affected sales and marginal advertising 
affected sales graphs versus price levels are given in Figure 3.4 and in Figure 
3.5, respectively. 
Figure 3.4 Change in advertising affected sales according to price 
Figure 3.5 Change in marginal advertising affected sales according to price 
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3.1.4. Structure of Firms 
Except from marketing environment affecting firm’s decisions, their internal 
production conditions and managerial decisions have impacts on their strategies. 
Although it is assumed that both firms compete in the same market with perfect 
substitute products, they might have different internal conditions, such as manufacturing 
technologies, labor efficiency etc. The following are the assumptions about the 
structures of the firms:  
 
a) Firms have similar manufacturing environments but their cost structures are 
slightly different. This might result from the firms employing different 
production technologies and / or different manufacturing systems.  
b)  It is assumed that firms set their total advertising budgets at about 5 – 10 % of 
their total revenue. Percentage of sales method is described by Lilien and 
Rangaswamy (1998).  
c) It is assumed that economies of scale display the production costs of the firms. 
This is represented by a piecewise linear function. At certain levels of 
production volume, production cost per unit decreases, and then stays constant 
over a range of production values. Figure 3.6 represents this piecewise linear 
cost function.  
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Figure 3.6 Piece-wise linear production cost function 
 
Under environmental and internal conditions assumed, a mathematical model is 
developed. This model is described in the following section.  
3.2. Proposed Model 
The mathematical modeling of the problem is developed as a mixed integer non-
linear programming model. First, the demand generation function is defined. The 
demand is assumed to depend on pricing and advertising decisions of the firm, as well 
as its competitor’s pricing and advertising decisions, which are included as parameters. 
Second, a mathematical model, representing the firm’s profit as the objective function 
and employing production and marketing constraints is introduced. In the following 
sections the demand function and the mathematical model are described in detail.  
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3.2.1. Demand Function 
The demand generation function consists of three main parts, resulting in the 
demand value in sum. Each of these parts is related to marketing assumptions.  
 
First, the demand generated by the firm’s own pricing decisions is included into 
the demand function. Here, price elasticity is employed having effect on demand 
according to price changes. A constant parameter is used to define the possible demand. 
With these parameters and price variable, this part of demand function is defined in 
equation (3.5): 
      
1
1
iP
α
β       (3.5) 
Here the parameter β1 is demand parameter due to price. This parameter gives a 
constant demand value, and this demand value is subject to change according to pricing 
decisions. The price elasticity is employed as a power of price value. α1 denotes the 
price elasticity and it is constant throughout the planning horizon. However, Pi takes 
different values at each period i.  
 
Second, the advertising affected demand is modeled. In this part, all the 
assumptions given before are combined. The additional part related with advertising is 
given in equation (3.6): 
( )21 2 1( * ) *1 * 1 i i k
N
k b P Ak
aw d
e
γ γ
− +
  
− + +  =  
  + 
+ ∑
      (3.6) 
 
In this function, advertising affected demand is created according to pricing and 
advertising decisions. The function is based on mainly logistic function defined before. 
The parameters of a, b, and d represent their direct meanings defined in previous 
sections, where a is the upper limit coefficient for advertising attracted demand, b is the 
shifting parameter for marginal advertising curve, and d is correction parameter for 
advertising attracted sales curve. The advertising impact factor, c, is employed as 
(γ1*P2) + γ2 and it is related with advertising expenses. The logistic functions are 
summed up over k, which is the index of lagged effect periods. The number of periods, 
on which the lagged advertising effect impacts is N. wk denotes the lagged effect weight 
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corresponding to previous kth period. An important point here is that the index of 
advertising is defined to be (i-k+1) to include each period’s advertising to weighted 
calculation. However, only i is used for price index, since it is assumed that even though 
advertising is done before the current period, its demand generation efficiency depends 
on active period’s price. 
 
The third and the last part of demand function is related with competitor effects. 
Since the market is assumed to be duopolistic, this part is developed to reflect the 
impact of the competitor’s decisions on the demand for the product of the firm. As it is 
defined previously, the demand of a firm is affected by price difference between 
products of firms. This price difference is employed by relative position of price 
difference with respect to actual price level. Advertising of competitor is also assumed 
to have impact on the demand for the product of the firm. This impact is formed within 
the equation by adding more potential customers to segment that is concerning the price 
difference. Under the stated assumptions, the third part of the demand function is 
formed and reported as equation (3.7): 
    ( )
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∑   (3.7) 
 
In the third part of the demand function, division of the price difference to the 
actual price of the firm’s product represents relative price difference impact. This ratio 
is used in order to express the relative importance of the difference between product 
prices of firms in comparison to the actual price of the product of the firm. Here, the 
importance of the price difference can be evaluated by the total number of potential 
customers taking into consideration this price difference in their buying decision. As the 
actual price of the product of the firm decreases, the importance of the price difference 
increases. In such a low-priced product case, the unit price difference draws attention of 
more customers than it does in a high-priced product case. This situation is a result of 
increased demand when the price levels are low, since more customers would have 
willingness to buy the product. In contrast, if the price levels are high, the importance of 
the price difference diminishes because of the decreasing number of customers deciding 
to buy the product.  Here, α2 denotes reverse cross-price elasticity. Reverse cross-price 
elasticity is defined as (1 / αc). Since reverse cross-price elasticity is employed as a 
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power of the ratio (price difference / price), absolute value is taken in order to avoid the 
cases where this ratio might take on negative values. A constant proportion of 
customers affected by competitor’s advertising activities are also added to the potential 
customers concerning price difference. These customers are denoted by β3 and the 
constant proportion of competitor advertising affected demand is denoted by β2. This 
potential customer base is summed up and then recalculated by relative price conditions.  
 
The total demand function is defined as the addition of these three parts and 
shaped as equation (3.8): 
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(3.8) 
where, 
Di : Demand of the product of firm in period i, 
Pi : Price of the product of the firm in period i, 
Ai-k+1 : Advertising expenses of firm in period (i-k+1), 
P’i : Price of the product of the competitor in period i, 
A’i-k+1 : Advertising expenses of competitor in period (i-k+1), 
α1: Price elasticity of demand, 
α2: Reverse cross-price elasticity of demand, 
β1: Demand parameter due to price, 
β2: Ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect, 
β3: Cross-moving demand parameter, 
γ1 ,γ2: Advertising impact factor parameters, 
a: Upper limit coefficient for advertising affected demand, 
b: Shifting parameter for marginal advertising curve, 
d: Correction parameter for advertising affected sales curve, 
wk: Advertising related sales weight parameter for the k
th previous period. 
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3.2.2. Mathematical Model 
In this section, the mathematical modeling of the problem is introduced. The 
model is an NLMIP model, which involves binary and continuous variables and 
includes non-linearity in the demand function and the objective function. 
 
The proposed mathematical model of the problem is as follows: 
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i j
z P D A h I g B c X= − − − −∑ ∑    (3.9) 
(3.8)                                    for iD i= ∀    (3.10) 
1 1    for i i i i i ij
j
D B I I B X i
− −
= − + − + ∀∑    (3.11) 
iA AdvLimit≤        (3.12) 
i
i
A AdvBudget≤∑       (3.13) 
1
2
3
                                      for 
                             for 
                            for 
i
i
i
X GA i
X GB GA i
X GC GB i
≤ ∀
≤ − ∀
≤ − ∀
   (3.14) 
1
2
2
3
.                                 for 
( ).                    for 
( ).                    for 
( ).                   for 
i i
i i
i i
i i
GA IN X i
GB GA IN X i
GB GA JN X i
GC GB JN X i
≤ ∀
− ≥ ∀
− ≤ ∀
− ≥ ∀
   (3.15) 
'                                   for im P m i≤ ≤ ∀    (3.16) 
{ }
1 2 3, , , , , 0             for 
, 0,1                             for 
i i i i i i
i i
A X X X B I i
IN JN i
≥ ∀
∈ ∀
   (3.17) 
where, 
Xij : Number of units produced in the i
th period in the jth section of production cost curve 
Bi : Backlog level at the end of period i 
Ii : Inventory level at the end of period i 
h: Inventory holding cost per unit for one period 
g: Backlog cost per unit for one period 
cj: Cost of production in the j
th section of production curve per unit 
m, m’ : Lower and upper limits for price 
GA, GB, GC: Upper limit values for sections in the production cost curve 
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AdvLimit: Maximum allowed advertising expense in a period 
AdvBudget: Total advertising budget for all planning horizon 
INi, JNi : Binary variables 
 
In equation (3.9), the objective function of the model is defined. Profit 
maximization is considered as goal of the firms, so the objective function consists of 
revenue and cost parts. Revenue of a firm is generated by its sales, so total revenue 
during planning horizon is represented as 
      i i
i
PD∑      (3.18) 
where Pi is the price valid in period i, and Di is the demand generated in period i.  
 
Cost part of the objective function is composed of advertising, production, 
inventory, and backlog costs. These four cost components are included in objective 
function as follows: 
     i i i j ij
j
A hI gB c X+ + +∑      (3.19) 
 
Since the demand generation function is very complex, it is included into the 
mathematical model as a constraint for the sake of simplicity and represented in 
equation (3.10). The constraint supplied in equation (3.11) ensures that production is 
balanced with inventory, backlog, and demand. Demand generation plays an important 
role in production balancing. Whole planning horizon’s production decisions are given 
on the base of demand. Inventory and backlog quantities are also related with demand 
and production decisions. Inventory can be defined as excess quantity of goods 
produced at the end of a period. Backlog is the demand that is not met at the end of a 
period and is postponed to next period to be met. This constraint ensures that the total 
demand either will be met in a period, if excess production is made this will be counted 
as inventory, or will be backlogged to be met in the following periods. It also ensures 
that backlogged demand and stocked goods in previous periods are carried to this 
period.  
 
Equation (3.12) ensures that advertising expense in a period does not exceed 
periodic limitation. The next constraint, (3.13), limits total advertising expenses during 
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the planning horizon and prevents exceeding expenses. These two constraints are 
double constraints and they control the distribution of advertising expenses over the 
planning horizon. 
 
Equation sets (3.14) and (3.15) are piece-wise linear production cost constraints. 
First set, (3.14) enforces each segment’s production volume is between segment 
intervals end points. The constraint sets (3.15) ensure that the first, second, and third 
sections of the production cost functions will be filled consequently and none of the 
sections will be used before the previous one is filled totally.  
 
Next constraint (3.16) defines the upper and lower limits for pricing decisions. 
Since the price is assumed to be in an interval, this equation is used.  
 
Last constraint set, (3.17), ensures that all variables are non-negative and two of 
them are binary.  
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4. SOLUTION PROCEDURE AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
4.1. Solution Procedure 
In this study, the proposed model is solved iteratively in order to investigate its 
ability to represent the real world conditions and to analyze how it reflects different 
marketing conditions. The solution procedure is described in the following sections in 
detail. However, before it is solved, experimental market environment is designed. 
Parameters both taking place in the model and in the demand function are determined. 
All values assigned to limits and parameters are evaluated and designed to create a 
representative market defined in market environment. Although these values are not 
taken from an empirical study, they are selected from a large set of possible values, 
which are best representing assumed market conditions. First, upper and lower limits of 
price level are determined. After that, primary parameters, including demand parameter 
due to price, ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect, cross-moving demand 
parameter, advertising impact factor parameters, upper limit coefficient for advertising 
attracted demand, shifting parameter for marginal advertising curve, correction 
parameter for advertising attracted sales curve, and advertising related sales weight 
parameter are designated. For the basic market environment price elasticity is assumed 
to be 0.9 and reverse cross-price elasticity is assumed to be 1. By the determination of 
these parameters, total advertising budget and periodic maximum allowed advertising 
expenses are evaluated. By using percentage of sales method described, total advertising 
budget is set to 5 – 10% of revenue. Since marginal additional demand created by 
advertising approaches to zero while advertising expenses increase, periodic advertising 
level approaches to a stable level, which does not provide any meaningful increase in 
revenue for increasing advertising expense. This saturation level is taken as maximum 
allowed periodic advertising expense limit. Since this limit exceeds when summed up 
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over the planning horizon in the maximum expense case, double constraint condition on 
advertising expenses is satisfied. After creating representative market environment for 
proposed model, the solution procedure is applied. Within the solution procedure, 
GAMS and GA is used as a part of procedure. In section 4.1.1, the theory and concepts 
of GA is introduced. In the following sections, the implementation of GA for the 
purposes of this study is described.  
4.1.1. Genetic Algorithms 
GA is a solution procedure based on natural genetic procedures. It follows the 
evolutionary steps of Darwinian Principle of Evolution. It includes survival of the fittest 
and concepts of biological genetic population events. It can handle solutions of NP-hard 
and large-scale combinatorial optimization problems in an acceptable amount of time.  
GA search differs from other search methods with its search concept on populations in 
some ways (Goldberg, 1989): 
 
• GAs work with a coding of the parameter set, not the parameters themselves. 
• GAs search from a population of points, not a single point. 
• GAs use payoff (objective function) information, not the derivatives or other 
auxiliary knowledge. 
• GAs use probabilistic transition rules, not deterministic rules.  
 
Since GAs use a coding for parameters, it enables the search to continue without 
constraints and it excludes the possible barriers that can interrupt the search, such as 
non-existing derivatives. In many search techniques, search follows a path from one 
point to a next one by some rules. However, GAs search from multi-point to multi-
point. This property reduces the risk of being trapped in a local optimum point when 
compared to other search methods. GAs do not need to calculus-based calculation 
techniques to continue searching. It only requires a payoff function (objective function) 
to search for a better solution. Finally, GAs use random choice as a tool to guide a 
search toward regions of the search space with likely improvement (Goldberg, 1989). 
These differences constitute the robustness and advantages of GAs over other search 
techniques.  
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The key elements of GAs are based on the natural genetics terminology. The basic 
concepts in GAs are as follows: 
 
i) Chromosome: A predefined structure representing a solution of the 
problem. 
ii) Population: Population is the set of feasible solutions.  
iii) Generation: Generation is a step in GA consisting of a population. 
iv) Gene: Smallest part of a chromosome representing a part of a solution. 
v) Fitness Value: Relative closeness to the stated goal.  
 
The chromosomes represent individuals in a population and are made of genes. 
Each chromosome corresponds to a solution for the problem and the search is based on 
these chromosomes. Encoding of chromosomes is an essential issue at this point. 
Chromosomes can be encoded in two ways: (i) direct representation; (ii) indirect 
representation. In direct representation, chromosomes include direct representations of 
solutions. Indirect representation is employed by using meaningful representatives for 
solutions in chromosomes. Random key is a kind of indirect representation, which uses 
random numbers to encode a solution. This representation eliminates the offspring 
feasibility problem by avoiding the issue (Bean, 1992). Genes are smallest parts of 
chromosomes and they denote a parameter or a variable. Genotype is defined as the 
total genetic code of an individual like it is in natural genetics. Phenotype is the decoded 
meaning of a genotype. In GAs, phenotypes represent a solution. However, to clarify a 
genotype, decoding has to be done. Decoding is the transformation of information 
stored in genotype of a chromosome into a solution alternative. Populations are 
solutions sets and composed of chromosomes. New generations of individuals are 
created from old generation’s individuals by some GA operations. There are three 
operators employed in GAs (Goldberg, 1989): 
 
i) Reproduction 
ii) Crossover 
iii) Mutation 
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In reproduction, the individuals having relatively better fitness values are cloned 
into new generation. This is based on the survival of the best theory of natural genetics. 
Crossover is based on the rationale of mating two individuals to produce off-springs. In 
crossover, two parents are selected from old population, recombined to form two new 
individuals, and one of the results is discarded at random (Back, 1996). The selection of 
parents from old generation can be done randomly or using roulette wheel technique. In 
roulette wheel technique, individuals are assigned selection probabilities according to 
their fitness function values. Thus, better fitness function value means higher 
probability to be chosen for crossover. In crossover, the selected gene segments of 
parent chromosomes are combined. The segments can be defined by using cutting 
points. In n-point crossover, n points are selected in a chromosome and parent 
chromosomes are divided into segments from these points. Then, each segment of new 
individuals are taken from these segments. In another type of crossover technique, 
uniform crossover, each gene of an offspring is cloned from randomly one of its 
parents. In figure 4.1 and figure 4.2, the crossover methods are represented.  
Figure 4.1 n-point crossover 
Parent 1 
Parent 2 
Offspring 1 
Offspring 2 
Crossover 
Gene Segment  
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Figure 4.2 Uniform crossover 
 
Another type of GA operator is mutation, which is based on altering some genes 
in a chromosome during new generation production. Mutation protects the search from 
losing some potentially useful material (Goldberg, 1989). Mutation creates some minor 
changes in chromosomes. This operation can be basically in three methods: 
 
i) Swap mutation 
ii) Bit mutation 
iii) Inverse mutation 
 
In swap mutation, two genes are interchanged in a chromosome. Bit mutation is 
altering a gene and assigning a different value to that gene. For instance, if chromosome 
representation is binary, bit mutation changes value of a gene from 1 to 0 or vice versa. 
Inverse mutation is performed on a selected gene segment in the chromosome. If binary 
representation is used, inverse mutation can be applied as bit mutation but on a gene 
segment rather than on a single gene.  
 
In GAs, reproduction and crossover are mainly used to search the solution space. 
Mutation is a secondary operation, and it is used as an insurance policy against 
premature loss of important notions (Goldberg, 1989). 
Parent 1 
Parent 2 
Offspring  
Crossover 
Gene 
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4.1.2. The Design of Genetic Algorithm-Based Solution Procedure 
As defined before, GA is used to solve individual models of firms. Here, the 
details of the GA method used are described.  
 
 Chromosome Structure 
 
The chromosome, as defined before, is used to represent a feasible solution of the 
problem in GAs. So, chromosome structure is important not only with its role but also 
with its usefulness in GA operations. In this study, chromosomes are defined as follows: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
Price Decisions Advertising Decisions Production Decisions  
Figure 4.3 The chromosome structure 
 
As shown in Figure 4.3, each chromosome has 36 genes. The first 12 genes of the 
chromosome represent the price decisions; the second 12 genes represent the advertising 
decisions, while the last 12 genes represent the production decisions. Each group is 
represented by 12 genes, because the planning horizon is assumed to be 12 periods. 
Finally, each gene in each gene group represents the decision value of corresponding 
period for the corresponding decision variable type. All the genes of the chromosome 
are random numbers between 0 and 1, so random key is used to represent the solution. 
This allows chromosome to represent a feasible solution even after the GA operations 
are applied. However, these 3 groups of random numbers represent values in 3 different 
intervals. Since first group represents price levels, its transformation to actual numbers 
differs from other groups. The second and third groups represent also different 
decisions, so all these three have different actual value intervals even though all genes 
are random numbers between 0 and 1. The transformation of the gene groups into actual 
decision values is performed as introduced below: 
 
For the first group (price) decisions: 
(Genes between 1 and 12) 
Price level of period i = [(Pmax – Pmin) * gene (i)] + Pmin 
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For the second group (advertising) decisions: 
(Genes between 13 and 24) 
Advertising level of period i = [(Periodical advertising limit / Advertising increment) * 
gene (i + 12)] * Advertising increment 
Here, advertising increment is defined as a constant value and it is used as unit 
increment level in advertising expenses. For example, an advertising expense of 50000 
is represented by (5*10000), where 10000 is advertising increment value and the 
multiplier 5 is obtained by evaluating the following expression: [(Periodical advertising 
limit / Advertising increment) * gene (i + 12)] 
 
For the third group (production) decisions: 
(Genes between 25 and 36) 
Production level of period i = (Periodical production capacity / 2) * gene (i + 24) 
 
Even though all these transformations of random numbers result in meaningful 
values within desired intervals, two types of infeasibilities can occur. One of them may 
occur if total advertising expense over 12 periods exceeds total advertising budget. If 
such a case occurs, the feasible values are obtained by the following method. First, the 
exceeding amount of advertising expenses is calculated. This value is denoted by ξ. 
After that, ξ is divided by advertising increment and result is represented by θ. If θ is 
divisible by 12 then [(θ / 12) * (advertising increment)] is subtracted from each period’s 
advertising expenses. This calculation reduces the advertising expenses of each period 
by an equal amount such that the total advertising expense equals the total advertising 
budget.  If (θ / 12) is not an integer, then all advertising expenses are reduced by 
multiplying by the factor (total advertising budget / total advertising expense). In this 
case, while the general advertising expense structure is preserved, the increment 
structure is changed.  
 
Another type of possible infeasibility may be caused by different total demand 
and total production values. Since no inventory or backlog is allowed at the end of the 
planning horizon, total demand must be equal to total production. If transformation of 
production values does not meet this condition, then one of two situations might have 
occurred. As the first case, total production may exceed total demand. In this case, total 
production is normalized to the total demand by subtracting average periodical 
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difference [(the difference between total production from total demand) / 12] from each 
period’s production. If production level of one of the period equals to a negative value 
after this calculation, then this chromosome is discarded and another chromosome is 
generated instead. In the second case, total production can be less than total demand. In 
this case, total production is again normalized to the total demand with the same 
procedure described above. The only difference here is that average periodical 
difference is added to each period’s production. If the production level of one of the 
periods exceeds total periodical production capacity, this chromosome is discarded and 
another chromosome is generated instead.  
 
 First Generation  
 
In the first step of GA, n chromosomes are generated, where n is the population 
size. Thirty six random numbers between 0 and 1 are assigned to each gene of the 
chromosomes and feasibility operations (repairs) are applied, if necessary. If this run is 
not the first step of the cycle for any of the firms, the best chromosome generated in the 
previous step of the cycle for the current firm is included in the population and n-1 more 
new chromosomes are generated.  
 
 Genetic Operations and Following Generations 
 
After the first generation, m-1 generations are created, where m is the desired 
number of generations. In this part of the process, three operations are used:  
 
i) Elitist chromosomes (Reproduction), 
ii) Mutation, 
iii) Crossover. 
 
At the beginning of each generation after the first one, desired number of 
chromosomes are directly reproduced in the current generation. These chromosomes are 
selected from previous generations according to their fitness values. These 
chromosomes are named as Elitist Chromosomes. After this application, (n – number of 
elitist chromosomes) chromosomes are generated with one of the procedures, mutation 
or crossover. In generation of these chromosomes, a random number is generated for 
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each chromosome. The decision of applying mutation, crossover, or reproducing 
without any change is given. If the decision is to apply mutation to generate one new 
chromosome, then a random chromosome is selected from previous generation’s 
population, again according to their fitness values. The selection possibility of each 
chromosome is determined according to its fitness value; so firstly, fitness value of each 
chromosome is normalized to satisfy summation of them to be equal to 1. After 
selection of chromosome to mutate, desired number of genes are selected randomly. 
These genes’ values are replaced by new random numbers. Then, feasibility operations 
(in terms of total advertising budget, and demand – production equality) are applied. 
Figure 4.4 represents the mutation operation. In this figure, genes 9, 17, and 30 of 
selected chromosome are decided to be mutated, and new random numbers are assigned 
to these genes during reproduction process. All other genes are copied with same 
values. 
 
Selected chromosome from jth generation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
 
Price Decisions Advertising Decisions Production Decisions  
New chromosome for (j+1)th generation after mutation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
 
Price Decisions Advertising Decisions Production Decisions  
Figure 4.4 Application of mutation  
 
If crossover operation is decided to be used to generate a new chromosome, then 
two random chromosomes are selected from previous population according to their 
fitness values. Both of these two chromosomes are divided into desired number of 
segments from random cut points. Here, the number of segments and cut points are 
same for both chromosomes. After that, first segment of first chromosome is taken. 
Then, second segment of the second chromosome is included. Next, the third segment 
of the first chromosome is added and this procedure is processed until all 36 genes are 
generated. Figure 4.5 represents the crossover operation. In this figure, each of the 
selected chromosomes are divided in to eight segments from seven cut points which are 
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10, 16, 21, 24, 29, 32, and 35. The new chromosome is formed by adding first, third, 
fifth and seventh segments of first selected chromosome before second, fourth, sixth 
and eighth segments of second selected chromosome, respectively.  
 
First selected chromosome from jth generation 
 
Price Decisions Advertising Decisions Production Decisions 
Second selected chromosome from jth generation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
 
Price Decisions Advertising Decisions Production Decisions 
New chromosome for (j+1)th generation after mutation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
 
Price Decisions Advertising Decisions Production Decisions  
Figure 4.5 Application of crossover  
 
After desired number of chromosomes are generated (new population is 
determined), the procedure repeats itself until desired number of generations are 
created. 
 
When all generations are created, the best fitness-valued-chromosome of the last 
generation is taken and its price and advertising values are incorporated into the other 
firm’s model. At the end of the second cycle and the following cycles, an equilibrium 
check is done and decision of continuing with the next cycle is taken. Figure 4.6 shows 
the flow of GA described. 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
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Figure 4.6 Flow of GA 
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4.2. Experimental Design 
In this thesis, it is aimed to show how firms behave in terms of price, advertising, 
and production decisions under stated assumptions. The behaviour means whether firms 
reach equilibrium points in terms of their decision variables and if yes, at what levels 
these points are. The levels of equilibrium points for price, advertising, and production 
may also be affected by different conditions. In order to clarify how different conditions 
affect the equilibrium, many experiments with different parameters are designed. The 
following parameters are examined for their effects on the equilibrium points.  
 
i) Initial forecasts about competitor’s price and advertising decisions 
ii) Price elasticity 
iii) Reverse cross-price elasticity 
iv) Advertising lagged effect weights 
v) Ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect 
vi) Cross-moving demand parameter 
 
As described earlier, price elasticity represents the change in demand due to 
change in price. So, what will be examined by changing price elasticity is how the firms 
set their prices to reach maximum profit and for which values of demand they achieve 
this profit. Reverse cross-price elasticity affects the responses of customers to the 
relative prices of both firms. The main goal of investigating reverse cross-price 
elasticity effects is to see how price and advertising decisions of firms changes and how 
relative prices are set. Advertising lagged effect weights determine how the additional 
demand generated by previous period’s advertising action contributes to the current 
period. Increased weights are expected to influence more customers to choose the firm 
making advertising even after certain number of periods. The experiments about 
advertising weights are designed to see how high or low weight levels affect current 
period’s advertising and thus the pricing decisions. It is also expected to expose the 
effects of different number of periods creating lagged effects. Ratio coefficient for 
competitor advertising effect is used to define the ratio of customers responding to 
competitor’s advertising activities in addition to relative price levels. Therefore, value 
of ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect is expected affect equilibrium price 
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and advertising levels. Cross-moving demand parameter is used to define the number of 
potential customers who are concerning relative price levels. So, how different levels of 
this parameter affect equilibrium points is another issue to investigate. Finally, different 
initial forecasts about competitor are investigated in experiments. The main objective 
here is to see how both firms make their decisions under different forecasts. Since the 
solution cycle is initiated with forecasted values of the competitor’s pricing and 
advertising expense decisions, effects of different forecasts are analyzed. The 
investigation aims to extract possible differences between equilibrium solution 
decisions and also between paths followed to reach these points. These initial conditions 
are thought to have two properties: i) different levels of price and advertising decisions, 
ii) different variances in the distribution of forecast levels. Decisions of firms under 
high, middle, and low levels of price and advertising forecast levels are investigated in 
experiments. The equilibrium point and decision paths followed to reach equilibrium 
can also be affected by the variance in the forecasts. Initial conditions that vary too 
much and that are smooth are examined. The Table 4.1 reports on the parameters to be 
examined and values assigned. The parameters assumed to be static during the planning 
horizon are given in the Table 4.2. 
Table 4.1 Examined parameters 
Parameter Value range 
Price elasticity <1, =1, >1 
Reverse cross-price elasticity <1, =1, >1 
Advertising lagged effect weights 1/0.5/0.3/0.1, 1/0.9/0.75/0.55, 1/0.1/0.01/0.001 
Ratio coefficient for competitor 
advertising effect 
0, 0.1, 0.5 
Cross-moving demand parameter 0, 1000, 2000, 5000 
Initial forecasts about competitor’s 
price and advertising decisions 
Combinations of low & high levels and 
variances 
Table 4.2 Static parameters 
Parameter Value Parameter Value for Firm Value for Competitor 
β1 17000000 c1 150 175 
γ1 -2.031 10-10 c2 100 125 
γ2 8.812 10-5 c3 50 75 
a 500 GA 1500 2000 
b -5 GB 3000 3500 
d -3.346425462 GC 9000 9000 
m 200 h 30 40 
m' 600 g 20 30 
AdvBudget 2000000 AdvLimit 240000 240000 
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5. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. Experimental Results 
The proposed model is solved by GA approach and by GAMS®. As mentioned 
earlier, the model is solved with different parameter sets. Initial forecasts are also taken 
as different starting parameters, and sub-parameter experiments are executed for each 
initial forecast.  
5.1.1. Initial Forecasts 
As described above, sixteen initial forecasts containing competitor’s pricing and 
advertising expense information are given as input for the first step of the cycle. Five 
experiments for the described parameters are made for each of these 16 initial cases. 
However, results of these different forecast experiments do not differ significantly. 
Since the model is non-linear and GA does not guarantee the global optimum solution, 
in some cases the experiments result in different decisions, which are not consistent 
with the conclusions stated above. All results of 16 experiments are analyzed. It is 
observed that most of them reach the same results in terms of general underlying 
decision structures although not in terms of numerical values. Finally, the results of the 
five experiments associated with the most consistent set are reported. The associated 
initial forecasts are reported in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 The associated initial forecasts 
Period Price Advertising Expense 
1 460 80000 
2 420 95000 
3 520 70000 
4 500 85000 
5 540 75000 
6 525 65000 
7 485 75000 
8 490 90000 
9 510 85000 
10 520 80000 
11 550 90000 
12 500 70000 
5.1.2. Price Elasticity  
The effects of price elasticity changes are investigated in these experiments even 
the product type is not changed. These experiments are generated in order to analyze 
how the model responds to price elasticity changes. As it defined before, price elasticity 
values are taken as smaller than one, equal to one, and greater than one. As price 
elasticity value increases in absolute terms (decreases in real values), the demand 
decreases, as it is expected even if same price levels are chosen. This also affects actual 
profits. Even though these results may be predicted mathematically by analyzing the 
proposed demand function; levels of advertising expenses, price level differences, 
possible changes in production policies, which cannot be easily predicted, are 
investigated with experiments. The results of experiments with different price 
elasticities are given in Table 5.2 (a) and Table 5.2 (b).  
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Table 5.2 (a). Experimental results for different price elasticity (GAMS results) 
  Price Elasticity 
  0.9 1.0 1.1 
Firm 418.5 286.6 329.6 
Competitor 460.8 366.7 331.6 
Average 439.6 326.6 330.6 
Price 
Difference 42.2 80.1 1.9 
Firm 110,252 88,785 28,146 
Competitor 125,993 42,104 18,250 
Average 118,123 65,445 23,198 
Advertising 
Difference 15,741 46,681 9,896 
Firm 8,249 7,240 3,122 
Competitor 7,228 4,500 3,000 
Average 7,739 5,870 3,061 
Demand 
Difference 1,021 2,740 122 
Firm 32,461,705 16,750,609 8,505,595 
Competitor 28,651,413 12,772,370 7,071,289 
Average 30,556,559 14,761,490 7,788,443 Profit 
Difference 3,810,292 3,978,239 1,434,305 
Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0 Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1,  
Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1  
Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
 
Table 5.2 (b). Experimental results for different price elasticity (GA results) 
  Price Elasticity 
  0.9 1.0 1.1 
Firm 431.3 309.7 255.4 
Competitor 451.9 379.2 331.3 
Average 441.6 344.4 293.4 
Price 
Difference 20.7 69.5 75.9 
Firm 154,167 122,500 95,000 
Competitor 166,667 135,000 105,000 
Average 160,417 128,750 100,000 
Advertising 
Difference 12,500 12,500 10,000 
Firm 8,171 6,960 5,282 
Competitor 7,675 4,951 3,178 
Average 7,923 5,955 4,230 
Demand 
Difference 496 2,009 2,104 
Firm 32,622,746 16,872,035 8,928,703 
Competitor 29,191,998 12,941,325 5,664,409 
Average 30,907,372 14,906,680 7,296,556 
Profit 
Difference 3,430,749 3,930,710 3,264,294 
Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0 Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1,  
Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1  
Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
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As it can be seen from experimental results, while price elasticity increases price 
levels decrease. Since demand parameter due to price stays constant for each problem, 
increasing price elasticity highly affects demand, relatively. Both firms reduce price 
levels in order to generate demand, but it is also seen that they do not keep previous 
demands even they make price reduction. An interesting result is that main firm reduces 
its price level as price elasticity goes from 0.9 to 1, but then it sets higher price as price 
elasticity goes from 1 to 1.1. This result is generated by GAMS solution. However, in 
GA results, firm continuously reduces its price. In general, it is seen that average price 
levels are decreasing.  
 
Advertising expenses are also decreasing like price levels, while price elasticity 
increases. Since advertising efficiency increases while price levels are decreasing, both 
firms prefer to cut their advertising expenses, since they set lower prices. S-shaped 
advertising affected sales function generates very small changes in demand after a 
saturation point with respect to price. Since advertising expenses needed to reach this 
saturation level decrease while price decreases, both firms make less advertising and 
generate demand. It is seen that firms stop advertising, where cost of additional 
advertising is not covered by revenue gained by additional demand.  
 
Lower price elasticity values mean that customer’s main consideration is not 
price. In such a case, it is seen that firms prefer making advertising rather than reducing 
prices. However, since higher price elasticity values represent higher interest in prices, 
firms prefer price reductions and lower advertising instead of setting higher prices 
supported by high advertising. Graphical representations of these results are given in 
Figure 5.1 (a) and Figure 5.1 (b). 
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Figure 5.1 (a) Experimental results for different price elasticity (GAMS results) 
Price
0
100
200
300
400
500
Elas = 0.9 Elas = 1.0  Elas = 1.1
Firm
Comp
Average
Advertising
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
Elas = 0.9 Elas = 1.0  Elas = 1.1
Firm
Comp
Average
Demand
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
Elas = 0.9 Elas = 1.0  Elas = 1.1
Firm
Comp
Average
Profit
0
5000000
10000000
15000000
20000000
25000000
30000000
35000000
Elas = 0.9 Elas = 1.0  Elas = 1.1
Firm
Comp
Average
 57 
 
Figure 5.1 (b) Experimental results for different price elasticity (GA results) 
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5.1.3. Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity  
The reverse cross-price elasticity is used to represent effects of changes in price of 
a product on demand of another product as described before. In these experiments, three 
values for reverse cross-price elasticity are taken. One of these values is smaller than 
one, the other is equal to one, and the last one is greater than one. Since firms are 
considered as competitors, their products are assumed to be substitutes. Thus, reverse 
cross-price elasticity values are taken positive. However, since ratio of price difference 
of products to actual price of each product is taken as basis of reverse cross-price 
elasticity, this parameter acts like cross-price elasticity. Higher cross-price elasticity is 
expected to generate more changes in demand of substitutive product when price of a 
product alters. Since the defined ratio is smaller than 1, when prices are not twice as 
high as each other, the reverse cross-price elasticity is used to represent actual effects of 
cross-price elasticity. The results of cross-price elasticity experiments are given in Table 
5.3 (a) and Table 5.3 (b). 
 
Table 5.3 (a) Experimental results for different reverse cross-price elasticity (GAMS 
results) 
  Reverse Cross- Price Elasticity 
  0.9 1.0 1.1 
Firm 393.5 420.2 451.7 
Competitor 428.8 463.0 488.1 
Average 411.1 441.6 469.9 
Price 
Difference 35.3 42.8 36.4 
Firm 103,211 111,423 127,707 
Competitor 115,303 129,368 143,149 
Average 109,257 120,395 135,428 
Advertising 
Difference 12,092 17,945 15,441 
Firm 8,737 8,245 7,728 
Competitor 7,719 7,238 6,990 
Average 8,228 7,741 7,359 
Demand 
Difference 1,019 1,007 738 
Firm 32,065,366 32,591,293 32,935,699 
Competitor 28,012,706 28,858,540 29,636,513 
Average 30,039,036 30,724,916 31,286,106 
Profit 
Difference 4,052,660 3,732,754 3,299,186 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1, Ratio Coefficient for 
Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1, Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
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Table 5.3 (b). Experimental results for different reverse cross-price elasticity (GA 
results) 
  Reverse Cross- Price Elasticity 
  0.9 1.0 1.1 
Firm 406.3 419.8 423.3 
Competitor 422.7 449.4 460.3 
Average 414.5 434.6 441.8 
Price 
Difference 16.4 29.7 36.9 
Firm 147,500 166,667 166,667 
Competitor 152,500 166,667 166,667 
Average 150,000 166,667 166,667 
Advertising 
Difference 5,000 0 0 
Firm 8,603 8,451 8,410 
Competitor 8,122 7,677 7,513 
Average 8,363 8,064 7,961 
Demand 
Difference 482 775 898 
Firm 32,186,078 32,445,801 32,702,079 
Competitor 28,458,659 28,892,809 29,046,123 
Average 30,322,369 30,669,305 30,874,101 
Profit 
Difference 3,727,419 3,552,992 3,655,956 
Price Elasticity: 0.9  Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1, Ratio Coefficient for 
Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1, Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
 
Since increasing reverse cross-price elasticity brings less importance to cross-
prices, firms charge more different prices. In addition, general price levels are 
increasing with increasing reverse cross-price elasticity. Since increasing reverse cross-
price elasticity generates less people concerning price differences, the main demand is 
generated by actual prices and advertising. In this case, firms increase their price levels 
to make more profit. As a conclusion, it can be said that when there are more customers 
basing their decisions on price differences, firms set lower prices to control this segment 
even they generate lower profit.  
 
Firms also support their higher prices with high advertising, when importance of 
market segment concerning cross-prices decreases. When reverse cross-price elasticity 
reduces (this segment becomes more important), firms reduce prices as described 
before, and they make less advertising since less advertising generates high demand in 
such lower price levels. 
 
Graphical representations of reverse cross-price elasticity changes are given in 
Figure 5.2 (a) and Figure 5.2 (b). 
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Figure 5.2 (a). Experimental results for different reverse cross-price elasticity (GAMS 
results) 
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Figure 5.2 (b). Experimental results for different reverse cross-price elasticity (GA 
results) 
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5.1.4. Impact of Advertising Weights  
The impacts of lagged effect of advertising expenses are analyzed by these 
experiments. Advertising activity made in a period is assumed to be having a decreasing 
effect during the next 3 periods. This decreasing effect is implemented by taking each 
period’s advertising expenses with active period’s price and recalculating advertising 
affected sales. These sales values are then multiplied by advertising weights. Three 
different advertising weights sets are analyzed with these experiments. Advertising 
weights are first reduced to minimum level representing faster decay of advertising 
effects. In the base case, middle level advertising weights are used. In the third case, 
higher advertising weights are used, meaning that it takes longer time customers to lose 
their interests in advertised product. The experimental results for different advertising 
weights are given in Table 5.4 (a) and Table 5.4 (b). 
 
Table 5.4 (a). Experimental results for different advertising weights (GAMS results) 
  Advertising Weights 
  1 / 0.1 / 0.01 / 0.001 
1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 
0.1 
1 / 0.9 / 0.75 
0.55 
Firm 397.5 420.2 455.7 
Competitor 491.8 463.0 493.3 
Average 444.6 441.6 474.5 
Price 
Difference 94.3 42.8 37.6 
Firm 54,375 111,423 138,857 
Competitor 63,850 129,368 158,594 
Average 59,113 120,395 148,726 
Advertising 
Difference 9,475 17,945 19,738 
Firm 8,454 8,245 8,134 
Competitor 6,275 7,238 7,369 
Average 7,364 7,741 7,752 
Demand 
Difference 2,179 1,007 766 
Firm 31,905,910 32,591,293 35,216,868 
Competitor 27,241,803 28,858,540 31,795,224 
Average 29,573,856 30,724,916 33,506,046 
Profit 
Difference 4,664,107 3,732754 3,421,644 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0, Ratio Coefficient for 
Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1, Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
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Table 5.4 (b). Experimental results for different advertising weights (GA results) 
  Advertising Weights 
  1 / 0.1 / 0.01 / 0.001 
1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 
0.1 
1 / 0.9 / 0.75 
0.55 
Firm 400.4 427.3 464.0 
Competitor 420.4 440.8 468.4 
Average 410.4 434.0 466.2 
Price 
Difference 20.0 13.4 4.4 
Firm 136,667 154,167 169,167 
Competitor 130,000 166,667 166,667 
Average 133,333 160,417 167,917 
Advertising 
Difference 6,667 12,500 2,500 
Firm 8,379 8,206 8,108 
Competitor 7,819 7,883 7,976 
Average 8,099 8,045 8,042 
Demand 
Difference 560 323 132 
Firm 30,616,317 32,356,846 35,377,109 
Competitor 27,040,054 28,914,046 32,126,736 
Average 28,828,186 30,635,446 33,751,923 
Profit 
Difference 3,576,263 3,442,800 3,250,373 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0, Ratio Coefficient for 
Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1, Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
 
As the advertising weights increase, firms set higher prices, which are supported 
by higher advertising activities. Since advertising weights are higher, firms gain more 
customers with lower advertising expenses. In such a case, firms select higher prices to 
make more profit. Although advertising efficiency reduces because of increasing price 
levels, higher advertising weights compensate this reduction. In case of lower 
advertising weights, firms prefer to set lower prices in order to generate more demand 
and to make more profit. In this situation, while advertising activity in a period 
generates additional demand, the effect of this activity does not generate enough 
demand in consecutive periods to make profit. Since advertising benefits are lower, 
firms prefer lower prices to generate demand. They also are able to generate more 
demand for lower advertising costs, since advertising efficiency increases by reduced 
prices.  
 
Another issue with different advertising weights is that by increasing advertising 
weights, firms select closer prices to each other. Since advertising expenses have longer 
effects on demand generation, firms avoid losing customers by setting higher prices 
than each other. As it is described in proposed demand function, each firm’s demand is 
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related with advertising activities of a firm’s competitor as well as difference between 
product prices. Setting relatively higher price than its competitor, a firm would be losing 
higher demand in high advertising weights case, since both firms prefer to make high 
advertising. When advertising weights are lower, firms do not prefer to spend on 
advertising. Thus, higher gap between price levels does not lead to the loss of many 
customers.  
 
Firms make more profits with higher advertising weights; even they set higher 
prices for their products. While more demand is generated by constant advertising 
expense relatively, profits made by unit advertising expense increases. This increase 
compensates the profit lost by increased price levels.  
 
Graphical representations of impacts of advertising weights on prices, advertising 
expenses, demands, and profits are given in Figure 5.3 (a) and Figure 5.3(b).  
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Figure 5.3 (a). Experimental results for different advertising weights (GAMS results) 
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Figure 5.3 (b). Experimental results for different advertising weights (GA results) 
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demand by a ratio. This case occurs oppositely and firm gets more customers with its 
competitor’s advertising activities if firm sets lower prices than its competitor does. The 
ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect is used here to define what ratio of 
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other firm’s advertising affected demand would prefer to buy firm’s product. Three 
cases for this parameter are analyzed. Setting this parameter equal to zero leads to the 
situation where no customers are affected by the advertising of the competitor firm. In 
other cases, increasing ratio values are used in order to investigate how firms behave in 
their decisions. In Table 5.5 (a) and Table 5.5 (b), the results of experiments with 
different ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect values are given.  
 
Table 5.5 (a). Experimental results for different ratio coefficient for competitor 
advertising effect (GAMS results) 
  Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect 
  0 0.1 0.5 
Firm 427.8 420.2 387.0 
Competitor 467.8 463.0 448.1 
Average 447.8 441.6 417.5 
Price 
Difference 40.0 42.8 61.1 
Firm 114,788 111,423 67,107 
Competitor 131,789 129,368 120,824 
Average 123,289 120,395 93,965 
Advertising 
Difference 17,000 17,945 53,717 
Firm 8,118 8,245 8,724 
Competitor 7,194 7,238 7,295 
Average 7,656 7,741 8,009 
Demand 
Difference 924 1,007 1,429 
Firm 32,725,973 32,591,293 31,736,789 
Competitor 29,037,240 28,858,540 27,910,222 
Average 30,881,607 30,724,916 29,823,505 
Profit 
Difference 3,688,733 3,732,754 3,826,567 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0,  
Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1, Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
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Table 5.5 (b). Experimental results for different ratio coefficient for competitor 
advertising effect (GA results) 
  Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect 
  0 0.1 0.5 
Firm 426.2 423.1 406.8 
Competitor 480.6 459.5 408.3 
Average 453.4 441.3 407.5 
Price 
Difference 54.4 36.4 1.5 
Firm 166,667 150,833 148,333 
Competitor 166,667 166,667 140,833 
Average 166,667 158,750 144,583 
Advertising 
Difference 0 15,833 7,500 
Firm 8,425 8,391 8,528 
Competitor 7,080 7,475 8,451 
Average 7,752 7,933 8,490 
Demand 
Difference 1,346 916 77 
Firm 33,192,927 32,782,516 31,515,437 
Competitor 28,903,731 29,004,064 28,359,253 
Average 31,048,329 30,893,290 29,937,345 
Profit 
Difference 4,289,196 3,778,452 3,156,184 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0,  
Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1, Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
 
While ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect increases, firms make 
price reductions for their products. When GA results are analyzed, it can be said that 
firms prefer closer prices. This can be explained by the logic behind the selected 
parameter. Since the value of parameter increases, more people are affected by other 
firm’s advertising activities. In such a case, firms prefer to set closer prices in order to 
prevent its customers who are attracted by its own advertising activities to select other 
firm’s product.  
 
As the ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect value increases, firms 
also spend less in advertising. Two rationales behind this action can be stated. First, 
since both firms reduce their product’s price levels, they can attract more customers 
with lower advertising expenses. This kind of advertising expense reduction can be seen 
in almost each case of price reductions. Second, since this parameter value increases, 
firms decide in a more risky environment. In order to prevent losing customers that they 
attracted by their own advertising activities, firms avoid making more advertising. 
Instead, they prefer to decrease prices and to generate more demand by this price 
reduction.  
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Even though firms generate more demand, on the average their profits reduce as 
the ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect parameter value increases. They 
reduce their product’s price levels but in response to action, they cannot generate 
enough demand increase. Since it becomes more risky to make advertising, they set 
their prices closer to reduce risk of making advertising. In this case, the segment 
deciding based on price difference is distributed with less deviation.  
 
Graphical representations of these experiments are given in Figure 5.4 (a) and 
Figure 5.4 (b). 
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Figure 5.4 (a). Experimental results for different ratio coefficient for competitor 
advertising effect (GAMS results) 
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Figure 5.4 (b). Experimental results for different ratio coefficient for competitor 
advertising effect (GA results) 
5.1.6. Cross-Moving Demand Parameter  
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even if no advertising is made. Both firms’ pricing decisions are assumed to be effective 
on the decisions of these customers. Four experiments are done in order to analyze how 
both firms’ decisions are affected by different number of this type customers. In first 
experiment, it is assumed that this parameter is equal to zero, meaning that there are no 
such customers. In other experiments, this parameter value is increased. Table 5.6 (a) 
and Table 5.6 (b) show the results of these experiments.  
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Table 5.6 (a). Experimental results for different cross-moving demand parameter 
(GAMS results) 
  Cross-Moving Demand Parameter 
  0 1000 2000 5000 
Firm 600.0 505.0 420.2 375.9 
Competitor 600.0 520.6 463.0 375.9 
Average 600.0 512.8 441.6 375.9 
Price 
Difference 0.0 15.6 42.8 0.0 
Firm 80,000 155,382 111,423 125,579 
Competitor 80,000 166,667 129,368 125,578 
Average 80,000 161,024 120,395 125,579 
Advertising 
Difference 0 11,285 17,945 1 
Firm 1,075 6,945 8,245 9,000 
Competitor 1,075 6,701 7,238 9,000 
Average 1,075 6,823 7,741 9,000 
Demand 
Difference 0 244 1,007 0 
Firm 5,811,966 33,343,703 32,591,293 30,989,734 
Competitor 5,417,830 30,522,841 28,858,540 27,689,344 
Average 5,614,898 31,933,272 30,724,916 29,339,539 
Profit 
Difference 394,136 2,820,861 3,732,754 3,300,390 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0, Advertising Weights: 1 / 
0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1, Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1 
 
Table 5.6 (b). Experimental results for different cross-moving demand parameter (GA 
results) 
  Cross-Moving Demand Parameter 
  0 1000 2000 5000 
Firm 510.4 483.6 422.9 379.3 
Competitor 530.3 478.1 463.0 379.4 
Average 520.3 480.8 443.0 379.3 
Price 
Difference 19.8 5.5 40.1 0.2 
Firm 162,500 168,194 153,333 127,500 
Competitor 162,500 166,667 166,667 130,000 
Average 162,500 167,431 160,000 128,750 
Advertising 
Difference 0 1,528 13,333 2,500 
Firm 6,899 7,256 8,401 9,000 
Competitor 6,611 7,373 7,417 8,981 
Average 6,755 7,314 7,909 8,990 
Demand 
Difference 288 117 984 19 
Firm 33,008,874 32,853,800 32,912,648 30,680,129 
Competitor 30,413,672 30,049,372 29,004,410 27,389,049 
Average 31,711,273 31,451,586 30,958,529 29,034,589 
Profit 
Difference 2,595,201 2,804,428 3,908,238 3,291,080 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0, Advertising Weights: 1 / 
0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1, Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1 
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While cross-moving demand parameter increases, firms prefer to set lower prices 
for their products. They also reduce their advertising expenses. As seen in previous 
parameter analyses, firms make less advertising when they make price reductions. This 
is a result of increasing advertising efficiency with price reductions. However, an 
interesting result which can be concluded by cross-moving demand parameter analysis 
is that the gap between price levels increases for second and third values of the 
parameter and then decreases for fourth value of the parameter. Since price levels are 
relatively higher for lower parameter value, the difference between two firms’ product 
prices cause relatively less demand difference. This situation occurs because of two 
reasons. First, when price levels are relatively higher then different price levels have 
relatively less effect on directly price related demand. This is related with β1 / Pα1 part 
of demand function, which defines demand generated by only pricing decisions of a 
firm. For higher values of prices, this value changes less than it does for lower values of 
prices. Second, in cases where price gap is higher, it can be seen that cross-moving 
demand is less. This affects the demand generated from price difference concerning 
segment, so lower parameter values relax firms to set more individually and to consider 
its competitor’s prices less.  
 
As the price levels reduce, the total demand generated by both firms increases. 
However, the profits of firms decrease, since demand increase does not provide enough 
additional revenue to compensate for this price reduction. While firms set 
approximately equal prices for higher cross-moving demand parameter values, they 
share this demand almost equally. As described in previous chapters, in such a case this 
segment acts according to price levels rather than price differences. Since price values 
are lower in these cases, total profit generated reduces.  
 
Graphical representations of experimental results of cross-moving demand 
parameter are given in Figure 5.5 (a) and Figure 5.5 (b).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
Figure 5.5 (a). Experimental results for different cross-moving demand parameter 
(GAMS results) 
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Figure 5.5 (b). Experimental results for different cross-moving demand parameter (GA 
results) 
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5.1.7. Impact of Cost Structure 
The cost structures of firms are assumed to be slightly different in terms of both 
unit production costs and piece-wise linear cost curve segment volumes. In order to 
analyse the impact of the cost structure differentiation between the firms on the 
decisions, experiments for each of the selected 5 parameters are executed.  
 
The experiments stated here are executed for the same costs as in the previous 
analysis for one firm. However, the cost structure of the competitor is changed and its 
unit costs are increased. In addition, production volumes representing the segment end 
points in the production cost curve are increased. The parameters representing the cost 
structure are given in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7 The different cost structures of the firms 
Parameters Firm Competitor (Slightly 
differentiated cost structure) 
Competitor (Highly 
differentiated cost structure) 
GA 1500 2000 4000 
GB 3000 3500 7000 
GC 9000 9000 9000 
c1 150 175 225 
c2 100 125 200 
c3 50 75 125 
 
The experiments represented here are executed using GA and the results are 
compared with GA outputs that are given in the previous chapters.  
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Table 5.8 The price elasticity results for highly differentiated cost structure 
  Price Elasticity 
  0.9 1.0 1.1 
Firm 434.7 335.4 228.8 
Competitor 524.0 474.2 413.7 
Average 479.3 404.8 321.2 
Price 
Difference 89.3 138.8 184.9 
Firm 150,833 130,833 99,166 
Competitor 166,666 153,333 125,833 
Average 158,750 142,083 112,500 
Advertising 
Difference 15,833 22,500 26,666 
Firm 8,403 6,890 6,854 
Competitor 6,291 3,708 2,066 
Average 7,347 5,299 4,460 
Demand 
Difference 2,112 3,181 4,788 
Firm 34,117,748 18,762,133 10,575,859 
Competitor 21,347,394 9,120,390 3,047,241 
Average 27,732,571 13,941,262 6,811,550 
Profit 
Difference 12,770,354 9,641,742 7,528,617 
Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0 Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1,  
Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1  
Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
 
As the costs of the competitor firm increase, both of the firms charge higher prices 
(Table 5.8). Even though the firm increases its product’s price, it is advantageous since 
also its competitor charges higher prices in order to make profit with increased costs. 
When compared with the previous results, it is seen that firms spend more on 
advertising. They use advertising to support their high pricing policy, although the 
advertising efficiency reduces with higher prices. The graphical representations of the 
price elasticity experiment results are given in Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6 The price elasticity results for highly differentiated cost structure 
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Table 5.9 Reverse cross-price elasticity results for highly differentiated cost structure 
  Reverse Cross- Price Elasticity 
  0.9 1.0 1.1 
Firm 425.8 430.6 453.4 
Competitor 495.2 536.3 532.3 
Average 460.5 483.5 492.8 
Price 
Difference 69.3 105.8 78.8 
Firm 153,333 159,166 170,833 
Competitor 166,736 158,333 166,944 
Average 160,034 158,750 168,888 
Advertising 
Difference 13,402 833 3,888 
Firm 8,560 8,598 8,083 
Competitor 6,739 6,077 6,288 
Average 7,649 7,338 7,186 
Demand 
Difference 1,820 2,521 1,794 
Firm 33,816,967 34,435,335 33,959,387 
Competitor 20,735,369 21,364,517 21,854,216 
Average 27,276,168 27,899,926 27,906,801 
Profit 
Difference 13,081,598 13,070,817 12,105,170 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1,  
Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1  
Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
 
As the reverse cross-price elasticity increases, firms prefer to charge higher prices 
and the price difference increases (Table 5.9). However, as the costs for the competitor 
increase, the competitor increases its product’s prices and the firm benefits from this 
increase by increasing its own product’s price. They use advertising to support their 
high pricing policy. It is observed that firm’s profits increase with respect to previous 
experiments while the competitor’s profits reduce. 
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Figure 5.7 Reverse cross-price elasticity results for highly differentiated cost structure 
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Table 5.10 Advertising weight results for highly differentiated cost structure 
  Advertising Weights 
  1 / 0.1 / 0.01 / 0.001 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1 1 / 0.9 / 0.75 0.55 
Firm 418.3 430.4 452.7 
Competitor 568.3 529.3 507.1 
Average 493.3 479.9 479.9 
Price 
Difference 149.9 98.9 54.4 
Firm 140,833 164,166 189,166 
Competitor 11,666 160,833 167,500 
Average 76,250 162,500 178,333 
Advertising 
Difference 129,166 3,333 21,666 
Firm 8,668 8,586 8,554 
Competitor 5,110 6,178 7,169 
Average 6,889 7,382 7,861 
Demand 
Difference 3,557 2,408 1,385 
Firm 33,631,353 34,289,886 36,246,921 
Competitor 20,990,341 21,230,078 23,489,619 
Average 27,310,847 27,759,982 29,868,270 
Profit 
Difference 12,641,012 13,059,808 12,757,302 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0, Ratio Coefficient for 
Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1, Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
 
As the advertising weights for lagged effect increase, firms maintain their price 
increasing strategy as in the previous experiments (Table 5.10). However, both firms 
charge higher prices when compared to the price levels in the previous experiments. 
This is due to the increased production cost for the competitor and the firm taking 
advantage of this situation. They also support these prices with advertising since 
advertising generates more demand as the lagged effect weights increase. It is observed 
that firm’s profits increase while the competitor’s profits decrease when compared with 
the previous experiments.  
.  
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Figure 5.8 Advertising weight results for highly differentiated cost structure 
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Table 5.11 Ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect results for highly 
differentiated cost structure 
.  Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect 
  0 0.1 0.5 
Firm 419.0 437.4 424.3 
Competitor 522.2 513.9 492.3 
Average 470.6 475.6 458.3 
Price 
Difference 103.1 76.5 68.0 
Firm 157,500 157,500 167,500 
Competitor 167,152 167,430 166,666 
Average 162,326 162,465 167,083 
Advertising 
Difference 9,652 9,930 833 
Firm 8,770 8,326 8,590 
Competitor 6,335 6,530 6,795 
Average 7,553 7,428 7,692 
Demand 
Difference 2,435 1,795 1,795 
Firm 34,079,793 33,893,826 33,520,943 
Competitor 21,232,394 21,493,960 20,728,382 
Average 27,656,093 27,693,893 27,124,662 
Profit 
Difference 12,847,399 12,399,866 12,792,561 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0 Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 
/ 0.3 / 0.1, Cross-Moving Demand Parameter: 2000 
 
As the ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect increases, firms charge 
closer prices for their products, so the price difference reduces (Table 5.11). However, 
the firm does not strictly make price reductions as the parameter value increases 
although its competitor does. This is a result of higher prices that the competitor prefers 
because of its increased production cost. Although the firm does not reduce its product’s 
price in absolute terms, it generates additional demand by charging lower prices 
compared to its competitor. Both firms prefer higher advertising. However, the firm 
increases its advertising expenses as the parameter value increases, since its price 
difference advantage reduces because of its competitor’s price reductions. When its 
competitor prefers higher prices, the firm easily generates demand by the increased 
price difference without any additional advertising. When the competitor reduces its 
product’s prices, the firm makes advertising to maintain the demand volume. 
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Figure 5.9 Ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect results for highly 
differentiated cost structure 
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Table 5.12 Cross-moving demand results for highly differentiated cost structure 
  Cross-Moving Demand Parameter 
  0 1000 2000 5000 
Firm 519.5 492.7 425.1 400.2 
Competitor 542.5 539.2 534.5 429.1 
Average 531.0 516.0 479.8 414.7 
Price 
Difference 23.0 46.5 109.3 28.9 
Firm 205,000 204,166 155,000 155,833 
Competitor 149,166 166,805 161,666 142,500 
Average 177,083 185,486 158,333 149,166 
Advertising 
Difference 55,833 37,361 6,666 13,333 
Firm 6,853 7,337 8,723 8,955 
Competitor 6,354 6,375 6,084 7,720 
Average 6,603 6,856 7,404 8,337 
Demand 
Difference 499 962 2,638 1,234 
Firm 33,213,341 33,710,639 34,513,408 32,585,770 
Competitor 23,125,767 22,790,155 21,291,129 18,906,540 
Average 28,169,554 28,250,397 27,902,268 25,746,155 
Profit 
Difference 10,087,575 10,920,484 13,222,279 13,679,230 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0 Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 
/ 0.3 / 0.1, Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1 
 
Firms maintain price reduction strategy, as the cross-moving demand value 
increases (Table 5.12). However, the prices are higher (in absolute terms) when 
compared to previous experiments because of the increase in the competitor’s 
production cost. They also reduce their advertising expenses as the parameter value 
increases as they did in the previous experiments. The demand generated by price 
difference increases by an increase in the parameter value, so firms do not need to 
achieve high levels of advertising. Another reason for the advertising expense reduction 
is the reduced prices and increased adverting efficiency. 
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Figure 5.10 Cross-moving demand results for highly differentiated cost structure 
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5.1.8. Logit Function Parameter Analysis 
In this section, the impacts of some parameters in the logit function are analysed. 
The two parameters investigated are a, the upper limit coefficient for advertising 
affected demand, and b, shifting parameter for marginal advertising curve. As the value 
of a increases, the total potential number of customer base, that can be generated by 
advertising activities, increases. So, the importance of advertising in terms of demand 
generation increases. As the parameter value for b increases, the marginal advertising 
affected sales curve shifts, resulting in less advertising expense needed to generate 
maximum marginal advertising affected sales. The results of logit function parameter 
analysis are given in Table 5.13 and Table 5.14. 
 
Table 5.13 Experimental results for different upper limit coefficient for advertising 
affected demand 
  a 
  100 500 1000 1500 
Firm 390.7 431.3 450.1 470.9 
Competitor 483.8 451.9 443.3 470.7 
Average 437.2 441.6 446.7 470.8 
Price 
Difference 93.0 20.7 6.8 0.1 
Firm 15,833 154,167 166,944 165,833 
Competitor 15,000 166,667 166,666 166,944 
Average 15,416 160,417 166,805 166,388 
Advertising 
Difference 833 12,500 278 1,111 
Firm 8,475 8,171 8,554 8,994 
Competitor 6,268 7,675 8,777 8,903 
Average 7,371 7,923 8,665 8,949 
Demand 
Difference 2,207 496 223 91 
Firm 31,187,264 32,622,746 36,194,520 40,535,447 
Competitor 26,313,653 29,191,998 33,365,628 36,768,824 
Average 28,750,459 30,907,372 34,780,074 38,652,136 Profit 
Difference 4,873,612 3,430,749 2,828,892 3,766,622 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0 Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 
/ 0.3 / 0.1, Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1, Cross-Moving 
Demand Parameter: 2000 
 
It is observed that firms reduce their advertising expenses as the upper limit 
coefficient for advertising affected demand parameter value decreases (Table 5.13). 
Since this parameter represents the maximum demand that can be generated by 
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advertising activities, profitability of advertising activities reduces. In this case, firm 
reduces its product’s prices in order to generate demand. As the parameter value 
increases, firms spend more on advertising, since the additional demand generated by 
advertising increases. Firms increase their product’s price levels. The decreases in the 
demand reasoned by price increases are covered by increased demand generated by 
advertising activities.   
Table 5.14 Experimental result for different shifting parameter for marginal advertising 
curve 
  b 
  -1 -3 -5 -7 -10 
Firm 491.1 437.5 431.3 387.5 389.2 
Competitor 521.5 448.5 451.9 443.0 407.6 
Average 506.3 443.0 441.6 415.2 398.4 
Price 
Difference 30.4 10.9 20.7 55.4 18.4 
Firm 107,500 132,500 154,167 163,333 166,666 
Competitor 115,833 118,333 166,667 166,666 137,500 
Average 111,666 125,416 160,417 165,000 152,083 
Advertising 
Difference 8,333 14,166 12,500 3,333 29,166 
Firm 7,477 8,083 8,171 9,000 8,692 
Competitor 6,834 7,798 7,675 7,504 8,015 
Average 7,155 7,940 7,923 8,316 8,354 
Demand 
Difference 643 284 496 1,623 677 
Firm 35,019,252 32,968,858 32,622,746 31,761,477 30,339,870 
Competitor 31,477,707 29,780,567 29,191,998 27,510,641 26,655,771 
Average 33,248,480 31,374,712 30,907,372 29,636,059 28,497,821 Profit 
Difference 35,415,449 3,188,290 3,430,749 4,250,837 3,684,099 
Price Elasticity: 0.9, Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity: 1.0 Advertising Weights: 1 / 0.5 
/ 0.3 / 0.1, Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect: 0.1, Cross-Moving 
Demand Parameter: 2000 
 
As the shifting parameter for marginal advertising curve value increases, firms 
prefer to charge higher prices for their products although they spend less on advertising 
since the advertising efficiency is increased (Table 5.14). However, firms reduce prices 
of their products, as this parameter value decreases. The advertising expenses needed to 
generate maximum marginal demand increases and firms prefer to make more 
advertising to generate this demand. Their price reductions are result of reduced 
advertising efficiency because of the decreases in the parameter value. The graphical 
representations of the experimental results of analysis of parameters a and b are given in 
Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12. 
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Figure 5.11 Experimental results for different upper limit coefficient for advertising 
affected demand 
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Figure 5.12 Experimental result for different shifting parameter for marginal advertising 
curve 
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5.2. Conclusions 
A large number of experiments using different parameter sets are made. As a 
consequence of the non-linearity of the model there appear to be a large number of local 
optima in the solution space. The results of GAMS® and the solutions obtained by using 
a GA developed to treat this problem are compared in terms of robustness.  The 
robustness is used to imply here a set of consistent solutions under different initial 
conditions and parameter values resulting in similar solutions in terms of general 
underlying decision structure comprised of pricing, production and advertising 
decisions.  
 
It is observed that GA solutions are consistent in most cases.  On the other hand, 
GAMS® produces a set of  various solutions, which are not consistent in the above 
defined sense. There is a need to provide an initial feasible solution for GAMS®. The 
problem is solved for a large number of different initial feasible solutions. It is observed 
that in most cases GAMS does not produce acceptable solutions, since these solutions 
are inferior in terms of their objective value to the solutions produced by GA. Different 
solvers provided with GAMS® are used with different initial feasible solutions. 
However, in many experiments GAMS® resulted in solutions that are very close to the 
initial feasible solution provided, thus with only little improvement. In addition, it is 
observed that GAMS® solutions are highly dependent on the initial feasible solution. On 
the other hand, GA is more successful in reaching better solutions, although global 
optimality of its results is not guaranteed. The use of random keys makes it easier to 
search the solution space by crossover and mutation operations. One important point 
about GA is that the best solution earned at a step of the solution cycle is included into 
the first generation of the next step of the same firm. This policy prevents the possible 
loss of best solutions between the steps of the cycle.  
 
The impacts of 5 analyzed parameters on the pricing and advertising decisions, 
demand volumes, and profits are represented in this Chapter. It is observed that price 
elasticity has the greatest effect on these values. This is a result of the demand function, 
since the price elasticity directly affects the customer type, which depends on the price 
of the product of the firm. However, price elasticity analysis is done in order to 
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investigate the responses of the model according to these changes. In reality, changes in 
price elasticity value in such amounts can only be observed when different products are 
considered. Cross-moving demand parameter has the second greatest effect on results. 
The importance of price difference increases too much, as this parameter value 
increases. This parameter reflects the number of potential customers mainly concerning 
the price difference, and the importance of this kind of customers in total demand 
generation increases. Firms take these customers’ priorities into consideration more as 
the parameter value increases.  So, the impact of this parameter is relatively higher than 
the others, except the impact of price elasticity. Advertising weights’ impact is not 
negligible on decisions of the firms, since these parameters have high effects on the 
benefits of advertising actions. Increase in advertising weights lets firms to charge 
higher prices, since it becomes easier to maintain the demand with the support of 
advertising activities. The impacts of ratio coefficient for competitor advertising effect 
and reverse cross-price elasticity are also important although they are less than the 
impacts of the other parameters. The importance and the effects of competitor’s 
advertising and pricing are affected by these parameters. Firms prefer lower prices for 
their products as the reverse cross-price elasticity decreases, since the increases in prices 
causes loss of more demand in this case. As the impact of competitor’s advertising 
activities increases, the other firm prefers to charge a price closer to its competitor’s 
price to prevent the customers, whose product awareness has been increased through its 
own advertising, to buy its competitor’s product.  
 
It is observed that although the importance of different parameters changes, all 
parameters have noticeable effects on the pricing and advertising decisions of the firms 
and on the demand and profit values, accordingly.  
 
Production scheduling outputs are given in Appendices A - E. It is observed that 
GAMS® results are better than GA outputs in terms of inventory and backlog decisions. 
GAMS® resulted in solutions consisting of less inventory and backlog. In most cases, 
GAMS® does not provide any inventory or backlog in production plans. On the other 
hand, GA results include inventory and backlog but these volumes do not result in too 
much increase in production costs. 
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The effect of cost structure is analysed and it is observed that changes in cost 
structures result in different prices and advertising expenses in absolute terms. 
However, general underlying decision structure does not change significantly. When the 
cost structure of the competitor is altered, both firms’ pricing, advertising, and 
production decisions change in the same structure as in the previous experiments of the 
standard cost structure. However, it is observed that firm uses the benefits of increasing 
price levels of its competitor. Although the firm increases its prices, it takes the 
advantage of additional demand generated as a result of the price difference although it 
increases its prices.  
 
Finally, the logit function parameters, a and b, are changed over a wide range in 
order to investigate their effects on the firms’ decisions. The parameter a affected the 
pricing and advertising decisions since it is directly related to the advertising affected 
sales. As the value of a is increased, it is observed that firms prefer advertising as a 
response to increasing benefits of advertising in terms of additional demand with less 
advertising expenses. Firms also increase their prices when the benefits of advertising 
increase. The parameter b affected the advertising decisions, since it is related to 
maximum marginal advertising affected demand value and needed advertising expenses 
to generate this maximum demand. As the value of b is decreased, corresponding to 
reduced advertising efficiency, firms prefer to charge lower prices to increase the 
benefits of advertising activities. With these parameters’ analysis, it is observed that the 
decisions of the firms highly depends on the values of these parameters, since both of 
these parameters affects the potential benefits of advertising activities in addition to 
price levels.  
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7. APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Production Plans for Price Elasticity Experiments 
GA Runs 
Price Elasticity = 0.9 
 Firm Competitor 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8408.11 809.49 0 6627.38 0 89.88 
2 6594.73 0 618.58 7103.48 0 492.51 
3 9000 0 289.87 8528.85 575.88 0 
4 7467.05 0 289.21 6893.5 0 728.48 
5 9000 379.32 0 8309.98 0 127.61 
6 8081.19 137.96 0 8495.53 247.37 0 
7 7645.87 0 2.5 7306.05 0 206.09 
8 7701.49 34.86 0 8167.48 31.22 0 
9 7420.37 0 521.79 7893.57 84.69 0 
10 9000 0 80.77 9000 1146.62 0 
11 8731.95 220.54 0 6590.26 0 155.28 
12 9000 0 0 7180.28 0 0 
Costs 7602538 47465 36054.13 10207226 83430.85 53995.62 
Total 
Costs  7686057 10344653 
 
Price Elasticity = 1.0 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 6965.14 72.95 0 5278.9 353.75 0 
2 6707.25 32.63 0 4305.91 188.88 0 
3 6657.79 36.11 0 4633.36 9.2 0 
4 8877.67 0 140.43 3325.21 0 1515.12 
5 8592.56 0 165.94 5739.31 146.7 0 
6 6284.43 153.1 0 5167.65 169.95 0 
7 8420.58 14.57 0 4310.32 0 379.77 
8 6369.2 0 110.67 5978.92 214.05 0 
9 5934.9 0 71.81 5062.77 0 316.5 
10 6530.71 0 1129.28 5022.6 0 92.11 
11 5676.26 0 920.28 6314.08 1078.82 0 
12 6503.69 0 0 4269.96 0 0 
Costs 6876009 9280.86 50767.89 7746935 86453.53 69105.08 
Total 
Costs  6936058 7902493 
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Price Elasticity = 1.1 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 6059.93 0 273.57 2007.06 0 654.48 
2 4691.06 0 210.89 4140.79 57.23 0 
3 5881.67 112.4 0 4233.75 706.79 0 
4 5084.44 0 433.44 858.99 0 1491.44 
5 4219.21 0 964.25 5108.94 0 65.44 
6 6440.91 0 1.59 4678.87 1294.84 0 
7 4831.15 3.33 0 699.17 0 731.39 
8 6082.02 0 208.23 5013.69 947.5 0 
9 5377.03 0 233.93 1193.87 0 1147.4 
10 4952.4 0 454.06 4623.23 282.35 0 
11 4565.18 0 71.49 720.21 0 2291.73 
12 5199.65 0 0 4862.21 0 0 
Costs 5869233 3472.02 57029.01 5333134 131548.2 191456.1 
Total 
Costs  5929734 5656138 
 
GAMS Runs 
 
Price Elasticity = 0.9 
 Firm Competitor 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8186.82 0 0 7017.89 0 0 
2 8242.99 0 0 7154.02 0 0 
3 8253.53 0 0 7358.46 0 0 
4 8315.93 0 0 7419.96 0 0 
5 8112.44 0 0 7374 0 0 
6 8239.36 0 0 7427.49 0 0 
7 8201.61 0 0 6939.32 0 0 
8 8121.63 0 0 6872.34 0 0 
9 8149.97 0 0 6869.47 0 0 
10 8264.29 0 0 7190.99 0 0 
11 8369.15 0 0 7443.59 0 0 
12 8541.98 0 0 7668.72 0 0 
Costs 7649985 0 0 9805219 0 0 
Total 
Costs  7649985 9805219 
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Price Elasticity = 1.0 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 7940.66 0 0 0 0 4117.3 
2 7394.33 0 0 9000 0 0 
3 7194.18 0 0 0 0 4150.37 
4 7058 0 0 9000 0 0 
5 7055.24 0 0 0 0 4138.48 
6 7019.39 0 0 9000 0 0 
7 7076.13 0 0 0 0 4113.75 
8 7096.46 0 0 9000 0 0 
9 7656.75 0 0 0 0 4082.76 
10 7156.31 0 0 9000 0 0 
11 7217.24 0 0 0 0 4065.7 
12 7026.93 0 0 9000 0 0 
Costs 7044581 0 0 7350000 0 740050.8 
Total 
Costs  7044581 8090051 
 
Price Elasticity = 1.1 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 0 0 3136.78 0 0 2883.05 
2 9000 2524.71 0 9000 2767.3 0 
3 467.36 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 3149.8 0 0 2922.33 
5 9000 2378.02 0 9000 2695.29 0 
6 569.06 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 3030.49 0 0 2869.87 
8 9000 2656.31 0 9000 2723.91 0 
9 193.33 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 3082.43 0 0 2869.17 
11 9000 2638.13 0 9000 2766.93 0 
12 240.38 0 0 0 0 0 
Costs 4573507 305915.1 247990 6000000 438137.2 346332.6 
Total 
Costs  5127412 6784470 
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Appendix B: Production Plans for Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity Experiments 
GA Runs 
Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity = 0.9 
 Firm Competitor 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8637.94 320.88 0 6907.12 0 394.58 
2 9000 25 0 8158.99 37.24 0 
3 7428.99 0 949.03 8053.36 49.02 0 
4 9000 75 0 9000 0 15.8 
5 9000 0 119.73 6837.88 47.35 0 
6 9000 208.75 0 8614.06 87.41 0 
7 7802.04 0 438.44 7908.47 0 113.9 
8 9000 99.54 0 9000 91.97 0 
9 9000 325.65 0 8130.42 83.47 0 
10 7641.33 0 478.63 9000 0 131.48 
11 9000 0 209.08 9000 480.91 0 
12 8730.89 0 0 6850.47 0 0 
Costs 7862060 31644.62 43898.32 10609558 35094.87 19672.81 
Total 
Costs  7937603 10664326 
 
Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity = 1.0 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 7917.75 244.01 0 6994.51 0 69.75 
2 7043.37 0 612.4 9000 68.62 0 
3 9000 0 40.83 6640.42 0 541.18 
4 8827.96 168.72 0 9000 0 90.02 
5 9000 0 996.83 7397 0 76.53 
6 9000 112.5 0 7534.53 0 214.92 
7 8715.19 147.12 0 8649.72 194.31 0 
8 7005.04 0 905.03 6982.16 0 508.74 
9 9000 279.85 0 8238.8 321.98 0 
10 9000 0 195.85 7010.02 178.19 0 
11 7903.33 47.89 0 8141.03 211.34 0 
12 9000 0 0 6530.02 0 0 
Costs 7770632 30002.43 55018.66 10208866 38977.63 45034.18 
Total 
Costs  7855653 10292878 
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Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity = 1.1 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 9000 103.93 0 6174.99 0 265.13 
2 7235.07 0 1122.91 7152.63 0 32.64 
3 7308.38 0 1073.39 7629.83 0 1000.36 
4 9000 0 15.59 8378.96 0 388.43 
5 8460.45 106.79 0 8137.49 292.24 0 
6 8086.37 12.6 0 7685.71 0 209.54 
7 9000 18.21 0 6818.05 0 155.65 
8 9000 0 71.21 7380.65 0 309.98 
9 7619.83 0 505.35 7198.04 0 1220 
10 8877.74 0 2.69 6681.32 0 1462.99 
11 9000 0 567.89 8454.1 0 299.8 
12 8336.39 0 0 8459.82 0 0 
Costs 7746212 7245.99 67180.63 10061368 11689.58 160335.5 
Total 
Costs  7820639 10233393 
 
GAMS Runs 
Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity = 0.9 
 Firm Competitor 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8546.4 0 0 8310.24 0 0 
2 8659.56 0 0 7655.96 0 0 
3 8754.69 0 0 7728.57 0 0 
4 8604.38 0 0 7616.79 0 0 
5 8573.71 0 0 7169.63 0 0 
6 8604.02 0 0 7584.95 0 0 
7 8680.25 0 0 8134.5 0 0 
8 8765.48 0 0 8373.94 0 0 
9 8925.62 0 0 7565.8 0 0 
10 8851.42 0 0 7675.82 0 0 
11 8995.31 0 0 7647.33 0 0 
12 8885.4 0 0 7159.39 0 0 
Costs 7942312 0 0 10246719 0 0 
Total 
Costs  7942312 10246719 
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Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity = 1.0 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8186.82 0 0 7017.89 0 0 
2 8242.99 0 0 7154.02 0 0 
3 8253.53 0 0 7358.46 0 0 
4 8315.93 0 0 7419.96 0 0 
5 8112.44 0 0 7374 0 0 
6 8239.36 0 0 7427.49 0 0 
7 8201.61 0 0 6939.32 0 0 
8 8121.63 0 0 6872.34 0 0 
9 8149.97 0 0 6869.47 0 0 
10 8264.29 0 0 7190.99 0 0 
11 8369.15 0 0 7443.59 0 0 
12 8541.98 0 0 7668.72 0 0 
Costs 7649985 0 0 9805219 0 0 
Total 
Costs  7649985 9805219 
 
Reverse Cross-Price Elasticity = 1.1 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 7382.87 0 0 6776 0 0 
2 7466.91 0 0 7030.86 0 0 
3 7547.11 0 0 7177.78 0 0 
4 7351.92 0 0 6726.57 0 0 
5 7338.59 0 0 6985.49 0 0 
6 7693.36 0 0 7104.57 0 0 
7 7863.31 0 0 7204.34 0 0 
8 7689.61 0 0 7230.24 0 0 
9 7980 0 0 7180.8 0 0 
10 8018.69 0 0 6754.34 0 0 
11 8006.99 0 0 7038.17 0 0 
12 8399.96 0 0 6672.08 0 0 
Costs 7336966 0 0 9591093 0 0 
Total 
Costs  7336966 9591093 
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Appendix C: Production Plans for Impact of Advertising Weights Experiments 
GA Runs 
Advertising Lagged Effect Weights 1 / 0.1 / 0.01 / 0.001 
 Firm Competitor 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8521.5 239.2 0 6838.84 0 260.53 
2 7832.31 0 605.95 8357.27 280.42 0 
3 8965.61 0 148.53 9000 0 15.09 
4 7815.64 26.2 0 7549.55 199.32 0 
5 9000 0 321.49 6858.31 0 498.28 
6 8476.79 99.18 0 7508.12 102.83 0 
7 8601.3 59.67 0 8481.72 629.73 0 
8 8318.29 0 760.81 6610.56 111.91 0 
9 8126.85 0 206.34 9000 57.11 0 
10 8133.78 432.1 0 9000 456.34 0 
11 9000 222.32 0 8023 77.19 0 
12 7756.16 0 0 6603.17 0 0 
Costs 7727411 32360.18 40862.19 10337291 76593.61 23217.01 
Total 
Costs  7800633 10437102 
 
Advertising Lagged Effect Weights 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 7646.99 0 243.08 7021.47 75.75 0 
2 7930.5 437.96 0 9000 597.19 0 
3 9000 0 110.25 9000 1342.67 0 
4 7911.71 0 128.34 7000.03 57.58 0 
5 7645.44 0 58.56 8425.06 669.3 0 
6 7646.62 0 476.34 8768.06 829.38 0 
7 8813.95 242.14 0 6187.7 0 351.21 
8 7458.85 0 843.49 9000 19.15 0 
9 9000 0 28.89 7455.67 234.05 0 
10 7495.53 0 800.3 7219.72 157.5 0 
11 8921.04 0 548.87 6522.8 0 657.13 
12 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
Costs 7623532 20403.27 64762.49 10395038 159302.5 30250.27 
Total 
Costs  7708698 10584591 
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Advertising Lagged Effect Weights 1 / 0.9 / 0.75 / 0.55 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 6859.06 0 199.67 8652.62 243.21 0 
2 8984.87 475.26 0 7540.83 0 166.74 
3 7111.57 0 456.39 7661.35 36.54 0 
4 9000 0 239.77 7554.6 49.72 0 
5 8987.51 510.15 0 8533.56 763.76 0 
6 7396.84 0 547.44 7067.06 0 52.01 
7 8004.41 0 63.69 8689.9 349.17 0 
8 8980.87 168.41 0 8178.76 683.48 0 
9 7683.13 0 602 8125.21 0 43.57 
10 8733.81 430.74 0 8998.83 467.56 0 
11 8421.03 475.46 0 6624.85 0 400.8 
12 7137.69 0 0 8089.78 0 0 
Costs 7565040 61800.31 42179.06 10478803 103737.6 19893.35 
Total 
Costs  7669020 10602434 
 
GAMS Runs 
Advertising Lagged Effect Weights 1 / 0.1 / 0.01 / 0.001 
 Firm Competitor 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8424.28 0 0 7273.96 0 0 
2 8429.73 0 0 9000 2049.61 0 
3 8761 0 0 0 0 3234.61 
4 8526.02 0 0 9000 0 0 
5 8395.25 0 0 6756.4 0 0 
6 8371.32 0 0 9000 2122.06 0 
7 8522.89 0 0 0 0 3185.62 
8 8396.1 0 0 9000 0 0 
9 8389.37 0 0 9000 2131.53 0 
10 8521.64 0 0 0 0 3180.13 
11 8395.06 0 0 9000 0 0 
12 8312.67 0 0 7265.81 0 0 
Costs 7772267 0 0 8947213 252128 288010.8 
Total 
Costs  7772267 9487352 
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Advertising Lagged Effect Weights 1 / 0.5 / 0.3 / 0.1 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8186.82 0 0 7017.89 0 0 
2 8242.99 0 0 7154.02 0 0 
3 8253.53 0 0 7358.46 0 0 
4 8315.93 0 0 7419.96 0 0 
5 8112.44 0 0 7374 0 0 
6 8239.36 0 0 7427.49 0 0 
7 8201.61 0 0 6939.32 0 0 
8 8121.63 0 0 6872.34 0 0 
9 8149.97 0 0 6869.47 0 0 
10 8264.29 0 0 7190.99 0 0 
11 8369.15 0 0 7443.59 0 0 
12 8541.98 0 0 7668.72 0 0 
Costs 7649985 0 0 9805219 0 0 
Total 
Costs  7649985 9805219 
 
Advertising Lagged Effect Weights 1 / 0.9 / 0.75 / 0.55 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8472.9 0 0 6543.54 0 0 
2 7891.83 0 0 7066.7 0 0 
3 7950.35 0 0 7467.52 0 0 
4 8169.16 0 0 7744.2 0 0 
5 8320.72 0 0 7766.65 0 0 
6 7891.26 0 0 7306.9 0 0 
7 7928.78 0 0 7362.14 0 0 
8 8000.26 0 0 7439.68 0 0 
9 8112.98 0 0 7539.85 0 0 
10 8365.87 0 0 7815.17 0 0 
11 8435.4 0 0 7374.1 0 0 
12 8074.12 0 0 6997.25 0 0 
Costs 7580682 0 0 9931778 0 0 
Total 
Costs  7580682 9931778 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107 
Appendix D: Production Plans for Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising 
Effect Parameter Experiments 
 
GA Runs 
Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect Parameter = 0 
 Firm Competitor 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 7716.74 0 313.6 6980.67 0 50.85 
2 8213.53 0 159.37 6689.51 416.71 0 
3 8330.23 0 55.79 6070.24 0 269.34 
4 9000 123.81 0 7977.07 526.23 0 
5 8445.44 3.4 0 6564.13 224 0 
6 9000 0 6.34 6441.22 0 565.25 
7 8019.37 0 431.87 8316.84 449.96 0 
8 8111.66 0 175.74 7459.05 0 107.69 
9 9000 0 100.76 7551.89 0 36.95 
10 7381.4 0 1394.8 7464.6 389.53 0 
11 9000 0 284.5 7098.87 721.45 0 
12 8882.91 0 0 6340.59 0 0 
Costs 7755064 3816.13 58455.39 9671600 109115.5 30902.59 
Total 
Costs  7817335 9811618 
 
Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect Parameter = 0.1 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 7647.15 0 78.81 7226.21 0 45.9 
2 8832.62 158.52 0 7539.2 1.81 0 
3 8409.07 0 327.4 7358.78 107.76 0 
4 8686.48 71.77 0 7215 0 373.22 
5 9000 56.48 0 7144.07 154.04 0 
6 8472.61 0 115.69 7143.03 32.49 0 
7 7969.3 185.48 0 6315.84 0 1441.22 
8 7828.84 0 314.96 9000 0 70.31 
9 8046.39 21.78 0 8145.59 106.71 0 
10 8073.02 0 133.17 7179.01 0 665.85 
11 8724.12 1041.01 0 8697.28 70.97 0 
12 9000 0 0 6732.71 0 0 
Costs 7734480 46051.08 19400.56 10027255 18951.32 77894.91 
Total 
Costs  7799932 10124101 
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Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect Parameter = 0.5 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8518.34 89.6 0 7577.88 333.08 0 
2 8564.59 150.75 0 9000 0 73.23 
3 9000 486.55 0 9000 0 76.77 
4 9000 0 1403.57 9000 0 208.14 
5 9000 3.34 0 9000 0 859.39 
6 8021.23 262.04 0 8614.46 163.16 0 
7 9000 304.65 0 9000 0 43.91 
8 8094.01 0 779.44 7733.55 21.46 0 
9 9000 280.37 0 8907.33 370.31 0 
10 7906.29 127.76 0 7477.21 0 424.33 
11 7232.86 58.03 0 9000 45.53 0 
12 9000 0 0 7104.51 0 0 
Costs 7816865 52892.41 43660.28 10906120 37341.26 50573.25 
Total 
Costs  7913418 10994035 
 
GAMS Runs 
Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect Parameter = 0 
 Firm Competitor 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 7976.89 0 0 6706.49 0 0 
2 8092.82 0 0 7015.83 0 0 
3 8173.36 0 0 7232.62 0 0 
4 8206.18 0 0 7362.9 0 0 
5 8221.46 0 0 7401.68 0 0 
6 7994.13 0 0 7357.7 0 0 
7 8121.58 0 0 7378.53 0 0 
8 8037.64 0 0 7331.38 0 0 
9 8090.3 0 0 7391.3 0 0 
10 8173 0 0 6975.02 0 0 
11 8278.71 0 0 7272.11 0 0 
12 8049.33 0 0 6907.31 0 0 
Costs 7570770 0 0 9774965 0 0 
Total 
Costs  7570770 9774965 
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Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect Parameter = 0.1 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8186.82 0 0 7017.89 0 0 
2 8242.99 0 0 7154.02 0 0 
3 8253.53 0 0 7358.46 0 0 
4 8315.93 0 0 7419.96 0 0 
5 8112.44 0 0 7374 0 0 
6 8239.36 0 0 7427.49 0 0 
7 8201.61 0 0 6939.32 0 0 
8 8121.63 0 0 6872.34 0 0 
9 8149.97 0 0 6869.47 0 0 
10 8264.29 0 0 7190.99 0 0 
11 8369.15 0 0 7443.59 0 0 
12 8541.98 0 0 7668.72 0 0 
Costs 7649985 0 0 9805219 0 0 
Total 
Costs  7649985 9805219 
 
Ratio Coefficient for Competitor Advertising Effect Parameter = 0.5 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8502.6 0 0 7182.55 0 0 
2 8286.04 0 0 7254.16 0 0 
3 8203.38 0 0 7537.39 0 0 
4 8567.37 0 0 7394.73 0 0 
5 8755.95 0 0 7507.91 0 0 
6 9000 0 0 7377.93 0 0 
7 8969.43 0 0 7185.17 0 0 
8 9000 0 0 6872.85 0 0 
9 8571.29 0 0 7213.95 0 0 
10 8826.8 0 0 7093.01 0 0 
11 9000 0 0 7252.25 0 0 
12 9000 0 0 7667.57 0 0 
Costs 7934143 0 0 9865460 0 0 
Total 
Costs  7934143 9865460 
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Appendix E: Production Plans for Cross-Moving Demand Experiments 
GA Runs 
Cross-Moving Demand = 0 
 Firm Competitor 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 5381.05 0 28.08 7204.41 796.49 0 
2 6645.63 261.62 0 8746.31 2527.59 0 
3 6958.59 0 130.82 4602 0 135.22 
4 5547.91 0 1442.29 7073.13 4.77 0 
5 8471.03 153.18 0 6649.99 0 502.56 
6 7555.26 0 551.13 7247.28 56.51 0 
7 6424.78 0 1537.38 7263.46 566.4 0 
8 8118.89 0 424.22 5986.15 0 479.48 
9 7715.29 472.85 0 6747.45 0 494.17 
10 5394.17 0 1403.37 7410.88 590.16 0 
11 7305.43 0 918.77 5775.92 847.94 0 
12 7273.33 0 0 4629.09 0 0 
Costs 6839567 26629.51 128721.1 9250206 215594.3 48342.68 
Total 
Costs  6994918 9514143 
 
Cross-Moving Demand = 1000 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8065.73 748.92 0 8196.51 617.57 0 
2 6505.36 280.24 0 7293.26 1037.99 0 
3 6770.63 0 156.69 6346.86 0 280.26 
4 7732.76 522.32 0 8579.48 362.51 0 
5 6238.57 0 651.91 6526.82 224.32 0 
6 8169.23 93.78 0 7137.23 82.83 0 
7 7334.39 0 65.13 6794.05 0 302.64 
8 8043.13 237.55 0 7670.83 0 297.31 
9 7572.97 1262.1 0 8631.66 20.69 0 
10 6156.72 245.73 0 7473.47 585.71 0 
11 7585.07 61.61 0 6093.16 0 843.44 
12 6892.96 0 0 7729.4 0 0 
Costs 7053377 103567.3 17474.59 9935455 117264.6 51709.56 
Total 
Costs  7174419 10104430 
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Cross-Moving Demand = 2000 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8109.07 0 37.06 7088.47 10.81 0 
2 7625.9 0 693.82 7992.46 0 136.89 
3 9000 0 246.37 7179.94 0 239.63 
4 9000 94.45 0 7905.4 0 39.91 
5 7993.21 0 130.3 7028.86 0 50.34 
6 8722.08 42.72 0 7590.81 45.91 0 
7 9000 6.95 0 7962.6 207.25 0 
8 7149.96 0 138.58 7436.27 0 359.05 
9 8740.5 0 25.53 6812.87 0 699.33 
10 9000 126.88 0 8760.67 108.85 0 
11 8108.15 129.07 0 6416.98 0 598.23 
12 8360.01 0 0 6830.67 0 0 
Costs 7740444 12001.93 25433.36 9975451 14912.77 63701.49 
Total 
Costs  7777879 10054065 
 
Cross-Moving Demand = 5000 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 9000 99.43 0 9000 0 440.54 
2 9000 0 1987.71 9000 0 124.44 
3 9000 0 239.93 9000 0 67.33 
4 9000 0 40.97 9000 209.5 0 
5 9000 95.59 0 9000 0 2021.63 
6 9000 0 543.18 9000 0 70.94 
7 8994.82 496.73 0 9000 0 20.74 
8 9000 0 154.47 8797.67 651.94 0 
9 9000 5.88 0 9000 913.66 0 
10 9000 0 1555.12 9000 0 246.43 
11 9000 311.96 0 9000 0 413.09 
12 9000 0 0 8970.37 0 0 
Costs 8099741 30288.18 90427.45 11382603 71004.14 102154.4 
Total 
Costs  8220456 11555762 
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GAMS Runs 
Cross-Moving Demand = 0 
 Firm Competitor 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 1092.61 0 0 1092.61 0 0 
2 1081.32 0 0 1081.32 0 0 
3 1074.54 0 0 1074.54 0 0 
4 1072.28 0 0 1072.28 0 0 
5 1072.28 0 0 1072.28 0 0 
6 1072.28 0 0 1072.28 0 0 
7 1072.28 0 0 1072.28 0 0 
8 1072.28 0 0 1072.28 0 0 
9 1072.28 0 0 1072.28 0 0 
10 1072.28 0 0 1072.28 0 0 
11 1072.28 0 0 1072.28 0 0 
12 1072.28 0 0 1072.28 0 0 
Costs 1934849 0 0 2257323 0 0 
Total 
Costs  1934849 2257323 
 
Cross-Moving Demand = 1000 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 6684.81 0 0 6460.27 0 0 
2 6386.07 0 0 6756.66 0 0 
3 6888.77 0 0 6911.32 0 0 
4 7055.87 0 0 6407.86 0 0 
5 7162.75 0 0 6705.61 0 0 
6 7213.61 0 0 6816.81 0 0 
7 6690.98 0 0 6920.71 0 0 
8 6962.86 0 0 6418.36 0 0 
9 7076.68 0 0 6719.12 0 0 
10 7193.92 0 0 6844.34 0 0 
11 7277.55 0 0 6978.08 0 0 
12 6745.63 0 0 6469.42 0 0 
Costs 6866975 0 0 9330642 0 0 
Total 
Costs  6866975 9330642 
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Cross-Moving Demand = 2000 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 8186.82 0 0 7017.89 0 0 
2 8242.99 0 0 7154.02 0 0 
3 8253.53 0 0 7358.46 0 0 
4 8315.93 0 0 7419.96 0 0 
5 8112.44 0 0 7374 0 0 
6 8239.36 0 0 7427.49 0 0 
7 8201.61 0 0 6939.32 0 0 
8 8121.63 0 0 6872.34 0 0 
9 8149.97 0 0 6869.47 0 0 
10 8264.29 0 0 7190.99 0 0 
11 8369.15 0 0 7443.59 0 0 
12 8541.98 0 0 7668.72 0 0 
Costs 7649985 0 0 9805219 0 0 
Total 
Costs  7649985 9805219 
 
Cross-Moving Demand = 5000 
Period Production Inventory Backlog Production Inventory Backlog 
1 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
2 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
3 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
4 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
5 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
6 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
7 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
8 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
9 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
10 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
11 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
12 9000 0 0 9000 0 0 
Costs 8100000 0 0 11400000 0 0 
Total 
Costs  8100000 11400000 
 
